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Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation 
Harry Surden∗ 
Abstract 
Research suggests that widespread uncertainty over the scopes of 
issued patents creates significant costs for third-party firms and may 
decrease innovation.  This Article addresses the scope uncertainty issue 
from a theoretical perspective by creating a model of patent claim scope 
uncertainty. 
It is often difficult for third parties to determine the legal coverage of 
issued patents.  Scope underdetermination exists when the words of a patent 
claim are capable of a broad range of plausible scopes ex ante in light of 
the procedures for interpreting patents.  Underdetermination creates 
uncertainty about claim coverage because a lay interpreter cannot know 
which interpretation will ultimately be elected and employed by a judge or 
jury in a patent infringement proceeding.  This Article models this 
uncertainty problem by the set of interpretations that are plausible for a 
patent-claim element in light of constraints that restrict meaning, internal 
and external to the patent document.  The model suggests generalizable 
properties against which we can critically evaluate patent interpretive rules 
and procedures.  On this basis, the Article develops an approach to 
improving the ex ante scope precision of any given patent claim.  The 
general approach is to reduce the set of interpretative scopes that patent 
claim words can plausibly obtain.  By increasing explicit, scope-defining 
information in the public patent record, it is possible to improve scope 
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precision by ex ante clarifying scope coverage and exclusion in foreseeable 
scope uncertainty scenarios. 
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I.  Introduction 
The Patent and Trademark Office routinely issues patents of uncertain 
scope.1  Patents give legal rights over inventions, and patent holders can 
exclude others from making, selling, or using products2 encompassed by a 
patent’s claims.3  A patent claim has an uncertain scope if it is difficult to 
determine which products infringe that claim with any degree of legal 
certainty.  Scope uncertainty is problematic because it can reduce net 
innovation in particular fields of endeavor.4 
Ambiguous patent claims often provide private benefits to the holder 
but impose external costs upon others.5  Uncertainly scoped patent claims 
can increase transaction costs for third-party firms that compete in the 
patent’s space.6  When firms cannot easily determine claim boundaries they 
                                                                                                                 
 1. It is difficult to quantify the number of patent claims whose scope would be 
considered highly ex ante uncertain. However, the overall level of ex ante legal uncertainty 
in patent scope is suggested by the difficulty in obtaining patent infringement insurance.  See 
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 51 (2008) ("[U]ncertainty about [a patent’s] scope and 
validity undermine the market for patent enforcement insurance."); see also Michael 
Fitzpatrick, Battles of the Tech Intellects, RISK & INS. (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.riskandinsurance.com/story.jsp?storyId=531905766 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) 
("Because of the severe monetary risks and uncertainty associated with patent infringement, 
the insurance market for this risk has been slow to develop.") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 2. To avoid verbosity, I will primarily refer to patent "product" claims rather than the 
more cumbersome "products or process claims."  Patents can and often do claim "processes" 
or "methods" which are "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be 
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
70 (1972).  The principles developed herein for product claims apply to process claims as 
well. 
 3. Patent law also allows holders to exclude others from "offering for sale or selling" 
those products covered by a claim. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 4. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 146 ("[O]ur evidence implies that patents 
place a drag on innovation."). 
 5. A patent claim drafted with scope uncertainty makes it more likely that invalid 
patent claims—or claims with a range of scopes, some of which are invalid—will issue.  
During prosecution, patent examiners search for prior art to determine if the patent meets the 
requirements of non-obviousness and novelty.  Variability in the scope of claim words 
complicates the finding invalidating prior art.  Examiners operate in a world of limited time 
and search resources.  Multiple, plausible interpretations mean a wider range of potentially 
applicable prior art.  If there are multiple interpretations, examiners are instructed to employ 
"the broadest reasonable interpretation."  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP 
§ 2111 (8th ed. Rev. 1, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 6. The tendency is to think about the costs that patents impose on third party 
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may be unable to mitigate legal risk by altering their behavior or "inventing 
around" known claims to avoid infringement.7  More generally, simply 
operating in contexts of endemic patent uncertainty can depress innovation 
and can raise the risks and costs of patent infringement.8  When these third-
party effects are taken into account, it appears that uncertain patent claims 
generate substantial costs from a society-wide perspective.  These costs are 
often exacerbated when patent holders opportunistically exploit uncertainty 
in actual, or threatened, litigation.9  Accordingly, the reduction of some 
patent scope uncertainty would likely lead to greater overall efficiency. 
The conventional view from the academic literature is that many 
problems of patent scope uncertainty are simply inherent and unavoidable.10  
For example, patents often issue in rapidly changing technological contexts.  
Precise claim scope delineation may be difficult when technological 
progression is unpredictable and unforeseeable technologies arise.  
Similarly, patent law requires applicants to employ written language to 
                                                                                                                 
competitors—firms in the same field as the patent holder—which make and sell competing 
products or processes.  But patent rights also cover the end users of potentially infringing 
products.  The cost to this class of third-party users (e.g., consumers or purchasing firms) is 
often overlooked.  This is explored in Part II. 
 7. The outcome of patent litigation is often unpredictable.  That can result in 
expenses of $5 million or more per side.  DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT 
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 18 (2009). 
 8. Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2004) ("Although these companies rely on patents to 
protect their inventions, they feel strongly that defects in the patent system are raising costs, 
[and] imposing uncertainty . . .  Ultimately, the companies claim these defects hinder their 
ability to compete, to innovate, and to contribute to economic growth."). 
 9. Some patent holders opportunistically exploit the ex ante uncertainty of claim 
language by suing (or threatening to sue) through the entire range of a given claim’s scope.  
Once issued, patent claims receive a legal presumption of validity.  It is often quite 
expensive to invalidate an issued patent claim.  Some strategically take advantage of the 
high cost of invalidation by invoking overly broad, but potentially invalid, interpretations.  
For pioneering work on the "notice externalities" of uncertain patent claims, see Peter 
Menell and Michael Meurer, Notice Externalities (unpublished research) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 5 
(discussing the E-Data patent infringement case). 
 10. See, e.g., ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 1–10 (forthcoming 2012); 
William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights:  The 
Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 
330–31 (2009) (arguing that increased certainty in the patent application process can lead to 
inefficiency). 
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delimit their legal rights within patent claims.11  Words have well-known 
limitations in capturing intangible concepts, and inventive ideas are often 
quintessentially abstract.  Language can be imprecise, ambiguous, open-
ended, or inadequate in describing relevant future conduct.12 
Even acknowledging these limitations, this Article argues that it is 
possible to broadly reduce patent scope uncertainty.  This is because many 
uncertainty issues do not arise for the intractable reasons just described.  
Rather, numerous problems of patent claim uncertainty result from scope 
underdetermination.  Underdetermination refers to scenarios where a 
patentee could have supplied information (e.g., in the patent document) that 
would have clarified the patent’s scope for a significant portion of relevant 
contexts but did not do so.13  Although there has been some recognition of 
an underdetermination problem in patent law, without a meaningful 
theoretical framework, the issue has been difficult to address.  To that end, 
this Article offers a model of uncertainty in patent scope.  This model 
suggests classes of efficient, well-targeted types of information that can 
reduce the external costs of patent scope uncertainty.14 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Strictly speaking, the legal scope of a patent emanates from the words of a patent 
claim, and not the supporting drawings or enabling descriptions that accompany claims. See 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention."); see also Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of 
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 
(1990) ("To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.").  Interpretive doctrine, 
however, allows for the usage of the non-claims portion of the patent document as evidence 
of meaning.  See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (discussing evidence outside the language of a claim that courts use when construing a 
claim). 
 12. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002) ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of 
a thing in a patent application."); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign 
Posts?  Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009) 
("Literally every [patent] case involves a fight over the meaning of multiple terms, and not 
just the complex technical ones."); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) ("Human invention and natural processes 
continually throw up . . . variants on the familiar . . . ."). 
 13. For an excellent description of the concept of "underdetermination," see Lawrence 
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 
473–75 (1987) (describing underdetermination as a decision, the results of which are a 
subset of all results that were imaginable at the time of the decision). 
 14. For a good high-level approach to improving patent certainty by requiring more 
information during patent prosecution, see Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 
IDEA 173, 174 (2006). 
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In Part II of this Article, I examine the evidence that widespread legal 
uncertainty in the existing patent system creates significant economic and 
social costs.  Scholars usually evaluate the patent system using a utilitarian 
framework—comparing the net social benefits from exclusive patent rights 
against their net social costs.  Uncertainly scoped patents appear to 
disproportionately tilt this calculus, increasing net cost.  Some researchers 
have argued that the external costs to third parties of operating in 
environments of uncertainly scoped patents may be leading to broad 
reductions in net innovation.15  If correct, this would appear to undermine a 
primary purpose of patent law, which is to promote net inventive activity.16 
Part III explores the theory of patent scope uncertainty more rigorously 
as a foundation for developing mitigation strategies.  In particular, I frame 
the issue of patent scope underdetermination as a special case of "legal 
uncertainty" generally by drawing from the jurisprudence literature.  This 
approach frames legal uncertainty in terms of ex ante17 constraints on "legal 
officials" (e.g., judges, juries, etc.).18  Uncertainty results when such ex ante 
constraints do not meaningfully limit (and hence render unpredictable) the 
range of ex post decisional outcomes available to an official.19 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 5–10 (discussing the inherent difficulties 
of equating patents to property, one of which is the inability to define the boundaries of 
patent rights). 
 16. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The [purpose of 
the] patent laws [is to] promote . . . progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited 
period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, 
research, and development.").  "The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive 
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into 
the economy . . . ."  Id. Scholars have noted other important purposes of patent law, 
including incentivizing disclosure and commercialization of technology. 
 17. The "ex ante" period that I refer to throughout this Article is the period consisting 
of any time up until a judge (or other legal official) makes an authoritative legal 
determination as to the meaning of a claim word during a patent infringement lawsuit.  Thus, 
because most patents are not litigated, and even fewer reach the claim construction phase of 
the lawsuit, the vast majority of patents will remain in the ex ante stage, never to have their 
claim words authoritatively determined.  See, e.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & 
Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top?  The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated 
Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (noting that only 1.5% of patents are litigated). 
 18. I use the term "legal official" broadly, referring not just to judges, but to any legal 
position that has the capacity to authoritatively resolve an issue of law or fact.  This term 
encompasses juries and administrative officials, in addition to trial and appellate judges. 
 19. See Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1158 
(2001) (stating that choices made by social actors are often underdetermined by "available 
principles" and influenced by "strategic behaviors"); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
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This view maps well onto patent scope uncertainty scenarios.  Third 
parties cannot easily determine the boundaries of a patent claim when it has 
a high degree of ex ante interpretive variability.20  A claim scope is variable 
if it has a wide range of plausible interpretations even after applying the 
internal and external constraints to the patent document that limit coverage.  
For example, consider a claim with the word "encryption," which can be 
reasonably interpreted broadly as "a cipher"21 or narrowly as "computerized 
encoding" read in context of the patent document.22  Such interpretive 
variability leads to scope uncertainty because a third party cannot know 
with any degree of legal certainty, ex ante, which of the plausible scopes 
will be adopted by a judge ex post (during an infringement lawsuit).23  If the 
application of one plausible interpretation over another would produce a 
diametrically opposite outcome such that a party would be liable for 
                                                                                                                 
LAW 132 (2d ed. 1994) (noting the considerable discretion allowed courts in making 
determinations); Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873 (1991) (finding 
that the power to create "exceptions" to defined rules "turns out to be the power both to 
change the rules and to avoid their constraints"); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the 
Cards:  Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 11–13 (1984) (characterizing the 
indeterminacy of legal doctrine as desirable and inevitable to an extent). 
 20. A patent claim that has a high range of ex ante interpretive variability can more 
easily straddle the issues infringement of patent validity. Ex ante variation in scope range 
permits a wide range of sometimes shifting meanings during litigation.  For some examples 
of shifting meanings of claim terms during infringement proceedings, see Highmark, Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (N.D. Tex. 2010). ("The Court 
also cited Allcare’s shifting claim construction as a basis for sanctioning Hill. . . .  Hill now 
explains that it is ‘not unusual’ in patent litigation for a party to adjust its claim construction 
during the course of litigation."). 
 21. See Cipher, OXFORD WORLD DICTIONARY ONLINE (2011) ("A disguised way of 
writing; a code.").  Cipher codes predate computers and do not require computer technology 
to implement. 
 22. For a similar case, see L & P Prop. v. JTM, LLC, 578 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (D. 
Mass. 2008) ("Defendants take issue with L & P’s definition of ‘encryption’ by citing 
numerous definitions from technical dictionaries."). 
 23. A patent claim drafted with a fair amount of scope uncertainty probably makes it 
more likely that invalid patent claims—or patent claims with a range of scopes, some of 
which are invalid—will issue.  During prosecution, patent examiners search for prior art to 
determine if the patent meets the statutory requirements of non-obviousness and novelty.  
Variability in the scope of patent claim words complicates the process of finding 
invalidating prior art.  Patent examiners operate in a world of limited time and search 
resources.  Multiple plausible interpretations means a wider range of potentially applicable 
prior art.  If there are multiple plausible interpretations, patent examiners are instructed to 
employ "the broadest reasonable interpretation."  See MPEP, supra note 5, § 2111. 
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infringement under interpretation "A" but not under interpretation "B," the 
claim will be uncertainly scoped relative to that product.24 
Part IV develops a formal model of claim scope uncertainty that builds 
upon the earlier model.  This formal model’s goal is to provide a more 
rigorous structure for understanding the problem of scope 
underdetermination in order to develop mitigation strategies.  This Part 
frames the salient features of scope uncertainty using the mathematical 
frameworks of set theory and constraint satisfaction.25 
This model highlights a marginal approach to reducing scope 
uncertainty.  We can view scope uncertainty as a relational inquiry from the 
perspective of a third party seeking to avoid infringement.  One can 
measure the adequacy of claim scope definition by contrasting the claim 
against a relevant set of products.  This set consists of all products that third 
parties would like to determine, ex ante, whether they do or do not infringe 
a particular claim.  Given that a claim’s scope is underdetermined, the 
marginal approach queries:  What additional information is likely to 
increase the certainty of such infringement analyses?  Requiring patentees 
to provide clarifying, scope-defining information ex ante can reduce scope 
uncertainty.  The way to increase scope certainty is to create more precise 
claim boundaries.  To make the boundaries of a claim element more precise 
ex ante, one must prospectively exclude ex post scope coverage.   
                                                                                                                 
 24. For example, imagine an accused product that employed non-computerized 
encryption in the product.  If "encryption" is interpreted broadly by a judge during claim 
construction, it may literally cover a non-computerized version of encryption.  By contrast, if 
the term is endowed with a narrower meaning restricted to computers, the accused product 
may not literally infringe.  The interpretation and hence scope may be hard to predict ex 
ante. 
 25. This constraint-satisfaction model serves as a useful analogy to the way in which 
patent claim interpretation operates.  The patent document serves to establish the boundaries 
of the patent holder’s exclusive rights.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (granting patentees 
various rights to use, and restrict the use of, the patented invention or process).  In 
interpreting patent claims, judges look to hone in on the meaning of the claim words by 
consulting evidence from multiple sources.  See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the court may utilize a number of sources).  
These indicia of likely meaning come from within the patent document itself (intrinsic 
evidence), as well as evidence of meaning external to the patent document such as 
dictionaries (extrinsic evidence).  Id. at 1582–83 (discussing the proper weighing of intrinsic 
and extrinsic evidence).  Judges typically use these indications to restrict the possible 
meanings of claim words to their most reasonable interpretation in light of the sources of 
evidence.  Id. at 1582 (describing clear and unambiguous language as highly relevant). 
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In Part V, guided by the formal model, I suggest policy changes to 
improve overall claim scope certainty.26  The model largely supports the 
Federal Circuit’s current patent interpretive framework but proffers 
important modifications.  For example, the model reveals that aspects of the 
doctrine, such as reliance on an "ordinary meaning in the art" default 
interpretive standard, often provide illusory constraints on claim scope.27  A 
more theoretically justified approach requires patentees to provide classes 
of low-cost but targeted scope-defining information in the patent record. 
Mindful of efficiency, this Part focuses upon disclosures that are 
limited yet likely to yield improvements.  For example, scope uncertainty 
problems often arise when different "embodiments"28 included in a patent 
share common physical design attributes.  A common issue of scope 
ambiguity concerns whether these shared characteristics should be read as 
implicit limitations on the scope of a given claim during an infringement 
proceeding.29  The model suggests that the patent system can efficiently 
reduce this and other predictable uncertainty issues by requiring patentees 
to explicitly disambiguate foreseeably problematic boundary lines ex ante 
on the public patent record.30 
 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 123, 127–33 (2005) (discussing different standards 
of "formalism" used by courts in their efforts to give patent law more certainty); Kelly Casey 
Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics:  Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 333, 365–66 (2007) (describing problems with formal patent rules in not incorporating 
relevant contextual information). 
 27. See Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("As a starting point, we give claim terms their ordinary and 
accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art."). 
 28. An "embodiment" is "a specific, disclosed example of how an inventive concept, 
that is more generally stated elsewhere in the disclosure, can be put into practice."  WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INT’L PATENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE 33 (2009). 
 29 Consider a patent claim with the word "motor," which only discloses internal 
combustion motors in the specification, but which is being extended to electric motors.  
There is a fundamental tension in patent law between the embodiments (or exemplars of 
technology) that are included in a patent document and the claim scope.  The scope of a 
patent claim is not supposed to be limited simply to the included embodiments.  Rather, it is 
supposed to be expansive beyond whatever particular physical form is disclosed as an 
example.  On the other hand, common features among included embodiments often suggest 
genuine limitations on the intended scope of a patent claim. 
 30. The public patent record generally includes the patent document itself as well as 
the prosecution history—the record of the patent prosecution.  Such a targeted approach can 
be efficient and complementary to other ex post approaches to handling problematic patent 
claims.  See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 45; Hubbard, supra note 10, at 331. 
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II.  The Problem of Uncertainty in Patent Scope 
Many patents granted by the Patent and Trademark Office have claims 
of ambiguous legal scope.31  The aggregation of so many uncertain patents 
creates an environment of ambiguity as to legal coverage, leading to 
significant social costs.  Before presenting a model of scope uncertainty, it 
is helpful to have an understanding of why uncertainly scoped patents may 
partially undercut patent law’s economic justification.  In this subpart I will 
survey some costs of uncertainly scoped patent claims. 
A.  The U.S. Patent System Is Justified if It Produces Net Social Benefits 
The classic justification for the U.S. patent system is utilitarian.32  
Under this view, the net benefits of a system of exclusive patent rights must 
outweigh the net costs from a society-wide perspective.33  Primarily, we 
grant private patent rights to induce technological inventions that would not 
otherwise be produced absent such incentives.34 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 101, 102 (2005) ("Claim construction occurs in every patent case during a 
‘Markman hearing.’").  For various reasons, it is difficult to quantify the percentage of 
indeterminate claims.  One admittedly imperfect metric is the claim construction rate during 
litigation.  Nearly every patent infringement lawsuit requires a judge to choose between 
different, but reasonably plausible, interpretations of patent claims.  Id.  Because claim 
construction occurs in every or nearly every case, one reasonable interpretation is that, for 
that subset of claims litigated, they are of ex ante uncertain scope.  Of course, this is only a 
rough metric of systemic uncertainty.  One would presume that there is selection bias 
because those claims that are litigated, rather than settled, are probably those that are more 
uncertain. 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
 33. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.) ("[T]he reason for the 
exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and copyright 
protection." (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 34. Beyond the development of inventions, patent rights are also thought to be 
important in incentivizing the commercialization of inventions, and the disclosure and 
dissemination of new technological information to the public.  See generally WILLIAM 
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
294, 308 (2003). 
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According to the standard economic account, patent rights are 
designed to overcome the "public goods" problem that leads to the 
underproduction of inventions.35  We can think of an invention as 
"information" because the value of an innovation consists largely in the 
underlying knowledge about how to make and use the underlying 
technology.  Because an invention is information, it has the economic 
characteristics of a "public good" (i.e., non-rivalry and non-excludability).  
In the marketplace for physical goods, excludability and rivalry are the 
properties that allow creators to sell copies of their product to each 
purchaser willing and able to pay.  Ideas, as intangibles, lack these 
properties.  It is thus difficult for inventors to use the traditional market to 
capture the value of their inventive contributions.  Inventors have no 
practical way of selling their inventive ideas to only those who pay for them 
while excluding others who do not. 
Because traditional market mechanisms are inadequate for intangible 
ideas, the belief is that, absent exclusive patent rights, inventions will be 
underproduced relative to a socially desirable level.36  Inventive ideas are 
often expensive for an inventor to develop, but once created, often 
inexpensive for competitors to copy.37  An inventor must recoup the 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Patent laws as formulated exist to rectify the "public goods" problem of 
inventions.  This problem is best understood by contrasting physical, tangible goods, and the 
"informational" nature of inventions.  Physical goods are, by their physical nature, rivalrous 
and excludable.  The ability to exclude those who do not pay for physical goods from using 
those goods allows sellers of those goods the ability to appropriate the value of those 
physical goods in the marketplace.  This ability to sell and profit from goods in the 
marketplace establishes a sufficient incentive to encourage producers of physical goods to 
invest in the means of producing those goods, as they have a mechanism to recoup their 
investment. Inventions are, at their base, non-tangible ideas, and are thus non-rivalrous and 
non-excludable.  Thus, absent some intervention, inventors will not be able to appropriate 
the full value of their inventions.  Without the ability to appropriate the full value of their 
inventions, inventors will not invest in research and development to create new inventions. 
 36. The notion of underproduction of inventions refers to two distinct ideas:  the 
ultimate creation of inventions and the pace of inventive activity.  The first refers to the idea 
that some inventions may never be produced at all absent adequate incentives.  The second 
refers to the idea that some inventions may still ultimately be produced absent patent 
incentives, but that the speed of innovation will be diminished and such technologies will 
arrive at a socially undesirable slower pace. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 302–
07 (discussing rules that reduce the social cost of patent protection). 
 37. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 80–81 (stating that the ratio of inventor cost 
to imitator cost is large, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry).  Although inventions 
are often costly to develop because they are essentially information, they are easy to copy by 
competitors who did not incur the same development costs as the inventor.  Id.  Competitors 
will be therefore be able to price the product lower than the inventor because the inventor 
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research costs of developing the invention, but copying competitors will be 
able to "free ride" off an inventor’s investment without having borne the 
development costs.38  The concern is that putative inventors will not invest 
in developing inventions in the first instance if they believe they will not 
later be able to recoup their investment due to underpricing by copying 
competitors. 
Patent rights are a government intervention designed to overcome the 
problem of underproduction of inventions in the normal competitive 
marketplace.  The legal system artificially endows inventive ideas with 
legal analogs to the excludability and rivalry properties that naturally allow 
the value of physical goods to be appropriable in the market.  Time-limited, 
exclusive patent rights are thus designed to incentivize private inventors to 
invest in, develop, and commercialize technologies.  Exclusive patent rights 
permit supra-competitive marketplace profits for a limited period to permit 
inventors to recoup research and development costs and appropriate the 
value of their inventive contribution.39 
From a utilitarian perspective, one weighs the net social benefits of 
exclusive patent rights against their net social costs.  All intellectual 
property regimes have costs, including dead-weight economic losses from 
monopoly pricing, administrative costs, third-party transaction costs, and 
increased downstream-development costs.40  Exclusive patent rights are 
                                                                                                                 
has to price the product at a higher level to recoup its development costs; whereas 
competitors did not incur such development costs and can afford to charge a lower price.  Id.  
Under conditions of perfect competition, competitors will drive the price of inventions down 
to their marginal cost.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38–40 (4th ed. 
1992).  Inventors will therefore be at a disadvantage because they incur the fixed costs of 
development in addition to the marginal cost of producing each product; whereas copiers do 
not incur the fixed development costs.  See id. (discussing the economics of intellectual 
property law). 
 38. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 294–95 (discussing the tension between 
the costs of keeping trade secrets and the patent disclosure rules). 
 39. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (agreeing that the "exclusion of competitors and charging of 
supracompetitive prices are at the core of the patentee’s rights, and are legitimate rewards of 
the patent monopoly." (quoting United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 
1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981))). 
 40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 16–21 (discussing the costs of granting 
intellectual property rights).  For a good discussion of downstream costs imposed by early 
patents, see Charles W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later 
Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 56–60 (2009) (explaining the problems that arise when 
allocating intellectual property rights to an initial inventor and a later improver). 
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primarily justified to the extent they incentivize the introduction of 
technologies that would not have otherwise been produced.  The additional 
public welfare contributed by these incentivized technologies largely 
provides the benefits that justify any costs of the system. 
Recent empirical research suggests that the existing patent system’s 
costs might outweigh its benefits.41  According to evidence from James 
Bessen and Michael Meurer, a significant source of these costs stems from 
the relative indeterminacy of patent coverage.42  If true, the net external 
costs imposed by uncertain patents may undermine the utilitarian 
justification for patent law.  Since patents of uncertain scope appear to 
disproportionately shift the cost/benefit calculus, it is worth particularly 
focusing on the certainty of patent scope as a problem within patent law. 
B.  The Social Costs of Systemic Uncertainty in Patent Scope 
In this subpart I will explore some of the external costs of patent scope 
uncertainty.  Before doing so, it is helpful to have an intuitive view of what 
it typically means for a patent claim to be ex ante uncertain in scope. 
1.  Patent Claim Scope Uncertainty:  An Intuitive View 
A patent gives the holder a time-limited right to exclude all others 
from making, selling, or using products or processes that fall under the 
scope of the patent’s claims.  The claims, found at the end of a patent 
document, define the legal scope and boundaries of "the subject matter that 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 120–44 (finding that, for most industries 
in the late 1990s, patents likely provided a net disincentive to innovate due to the costs of 
patent litigation).  Bessen and Meurer provide evidence that for the average firm outside of 
the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, the private costs of the patent system outweigh 
the private benefits.  Id.  This, of course, is a different measure than net social welfare—how 
the patent system benefits society as a whole.  Net social welfare is difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure empirically.  True, their results are not conclusive about net social 
welfare.  Nonetheless, their research provides some strong indirect evidence that the costs of 
the patent system probably outweigh its benefits.  If, as Bessen and Meurer argue, for the 
average firm, the incentives provided by the patent system are negative, it seems unlikely 
that the patent system will induce overall increased innovation, thereby increasing net social 
welfare. 
 42. See id. at 147–48 (concluding that notice failure and inadvertent infringement are 
major factors contributing to the surge in patent litigation). 
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the applicant regards as his invention."43  Patent claims are composed of 
language—by law, a single sentence that describes the technology or 
invention that forms the basis of the right to exclude.44 
Many instances of scope uncertainty involve claims with a high degree 
of ex ante interpretive variability.  The process of patent infringement 
largely involves comparing the words of the patent claim to the product or 
process that is accused of infringing that claim.45  The scope of a patent 
claim—which technologies it covers—will often turn on the interpretation 
of claim terms.46  A well-scoped claim will have, ex ante, a well-defined, 
bounded, and definite range of meanings. 
In an uncertainly scoped patent claim, the range of plausible scopes is 
often variable.47  In other words, the legally authoritative meanings of most 
of the words of the claim are not definitively knowable ex ante, but rather, 
exist in a probabilistic range of possible scopes.  Patent claims with a wide 
range of interpretive variability often create scope uncertainty because it is 
difficult to know objectively, and ex ante, which is the legally 
determinative scope.  The scope of such a claim may be an uncertain, 
probabilistic assessment, because during a patent infringement lawsuit, a 
judge (or jury) might elect any one of the plausible interpretations.  
Ex ante, third parties cannot tell what is, and what is not, covered by 
such patent claims with any degree of legal certainty.  With one 
interpretation, a competitor’s product could be held to infringe and with 
another interpretation, not.  Precision of scope therefore refers to the degree 
                                                                                                                 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 44. Id.; see also MPEP, supra note 5, § 608.01(m) ("Each claim begins with a capital 
letter and ends with a period.  Periods may not be used elsewhere in the claims except for 
abbreviations."). 
 45. There are two steps to the infringement analysis—literal infringement, and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 4 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON 
PATENTS § 13:1 (4th ed. 2010).  For the moment, I focus on the former, and equate the prima 
facie scope of a patent with literal infringement of the claim. 
 46. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that "it is 
axiomatic that claims define the invention which an applicant believes is patentable"). 
 47. Thus, when we talk about an uncertainly scoped patent we are not concerned with 
a broadly but well-defined scope (e.g., clearly "All motor vehicles").  Rather, we are 
concerned with scenarios where the scope of the patent may be broad, narrow, or somewhere 
in between—we are just unable to determine which (e.g., unclear if "All motor vehicles," 
"electric-motor vehicles," "plug-in hybrid cars").  For reasons explained later, this Article is 
not concerned with broadly scoped patents but uncertainly scoped patents, whether broad or 
narrow. 
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to which the patent adequately conveys to third parties which technologies 
are, and which are not, covered by a given patent claim.48  
2.  External Costs to Third Parties of Uncertainly Scoped Patents 
The primary problem with uncertainly scoped patents is that they can 
impose significant costs on third parties.  Any issued U.S. patent is 
potentially valid against all parties within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.49  In any field of endeavor, a firm must take into account the total 
risk of patent infringement based upon their activities or products.  This risk 
and associated expenses represent costs that firms internalize into their 
investment and production decisions.  All patents impose some cost on third 
parties, but uncertainly scoped patents impose disproportionately greater 
costs. 
When a patent claim is uncertain because of a wide range of 
interpretive variability, a third party cannot easily determine its 
boundaries.50  This increases the information transaction costs for a firm of 
estimating and assessing infringement liability risk.51  It also raises the cost 
of proactively reducing risk by reorienting production activities, or 
attempting to "invent around" a particular claim by creating products that 
do not infringe.  Such legal risk reduction strategies are more difficult 
because, in many cases, a firm cannot know with any level of certainty 
what the ex post boundaries of a given claim will be held to be.  In many 
cases where a patent claim exhibits a wide scope variance, it might be 
impossible or costly to restructure a product outside of its scope. 
Whether or not firms routinely clear patent rights prospectively, they 
do often become aware of patents in their field and must make investment 
and planning decisions accordingly.52  For example, inventing companies 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Mullally, supra note 26, at 333 ("The claims inform us of the boundaries 
delineating the subject matter over which the inventor holds an exclusive right."). 
 49. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (discussing patent infringement). 
 50. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 147 ("[T]he boundaries created by patents 
are hidden, unclear, or too costly to determine."). 
 51. See id. at 147–50 (suggesting that patent scope uncertainty increases patent 
litigation risk, which acts as a disincentive to innovation). 
 52. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22 
(explaining how inventors in patent law commonly adopt a wait and see approach for patent 
infringement rather than conducting research into the patent rights landscape prior to 
invention). 
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routinely receive "cease and desist" letters that alert them to particular 
patents, or are actually sued for infringing particular patent claims.53  When 
the claims at issue are uncertain, risk-mitigation strategies will be reduced 
because of the inability to fully determine conduct firmly outside of that 
claim’s scope.  Such claims likely also increase the costs of patent 
litigation.  The inability to unambiguously determine coverage contributes 
to the typical costs of patent-infringement litigation, ranging from $2–$5 
million per side.54  Legal uncertainty typically makes settlement less likely 
and pre- and post-litigation costs higher.  These higher litigation costs will 
cause a firm to redirect money that could have been directed to more 
socially productive uses.55 
Uncertainly scoped patents also increase firms’ costs of confronting 
potentially invalid patent claims.56  For a patent to issue, it must meet the 
statutory validity requirements of the patent act, including novelty, non-
obviousness, and enablement.  A patent claim that has a high range of ex 
ante interpretive variability can more easily straddle the issue of patent 
validity.  Some plausible interpretations may meet the statutory validity 
requirements while others may not.  Not only does this variable scope 
complicate the job of the patent examiner in discovering invalidating prior 
art during prosecution (likely leading to more claims with only probabilistic 
validity), it requires third-party firms to contend with more such claims that 
simultaneously have both valid and invalid prima facie interpretive scopes. 
These external costs become significant from a society-wide 
perspective when we consider the number of firms potentially affected and 
the number of patents potentially at issue.  Given the size of the United 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Also, company researchers sometimes come across or passively gain knowledge of 
existing patents.  Finally, in a minority of technological areas, such as in pharmaceuticals, 
there are well-known patents that are widely known by industry participants, and inventing 
entities frequently do actually attempt to do prospective searches of patent rights.  Id. at 29.  
Lemley notes that in the pharmaceutical industry, companies are required to list all of the 
patents covering each FDA approved drug.  This allows third parties to survey the patent 
coverage much more succinctly in that domain. 
 54. See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2009 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY (2009) (showing that the cost of patent-infringement litigation ranges from $1 
million to $25 million depending on the size of the firm and the stage of the case). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the E-Data patent 
infringement case).  The original invention covered by the E-data patent was a kiosk that 
produced digital audio tapes in the retail settings.  It was later asserted in patent litigation to 
cover broad swathes of e-commerce activities. 
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States patent system, even a small amount of systemic patent scope 
uncertainty can result in dramatic costs.  There are approximately two 
million patents in force at any given time.57  Each patent, in turn, contains 
approximately ten claims, with each claim bestowing its own separate legal 
right to exclude technologies.58  Thus, nearly every organization or 
individual has to incorporate into their planning the probability of 
infringing roughly twenty million active patent claims.  Even if we exclude 
active but unrelated patents, the number of claims that should be 
theoretically included in the expected cost valuation numbers is in the still 
unmanageable tens of thousands in many industries.59  Only a small 
percentage of issued patents are economically viable and ever litigated or 
licensed.60  However, even issued patents that have not yet been litigated 
may increase a firm’s internal expected costs if there is a non-trivial 
possibility of litigation.  Moreover, even if a small percentage of the viable 
claims are uncertainly scoped, given the large numbers of patents generally, 
the net costs can be quite significant. 
In theory at least, a third-party firm making investment decisions 
factors in the expected cost of patent infringement for some percentage of 
these patent claims.61  The Supreme Court has noted that even a small 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD PATENT REPORT:  A STATISTICAL 
REVIEW 23 (2008) (estimating the number of patents in force as of 2006 at 1.8 million). 
 58. See Dennis Crouch, Dropping:  Average Number of Claims per Patent, PATENTLY-
O BLOG, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/01/dropping-average-number-of-claims-per-
patent.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (providing a rough estimate of the number of claims 
per patent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  According to Crouch’s 
random sample of 22,000 patents, the average number of claims per patent has increased 
over the last twenty years, dropping slightly from its peak.  Id.  The number of claims per 
patent increased from roughly ten claims per patent in 1980 to over fifteen claims per patent 
by 2009.  Id. 
 59. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 8–9.  The authors estimate that for a firm 
selling products on the Internet, the firm would have to take into consideration over 4,000 
potentially applicable patents.  Id.  With an average of ten claims per patent, that translates 
into over 40,000 claims whose expected infringement cost might be incorporated by a firm.  
Firms may be able to filter out the vast majority of active patent claims as they are likely to 
be outside of any particular field of endeavor. 
 60. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1507 (2001) ("As we have seen, only about 1.5% of patents are litigated at all. The 
total number of patents licensed for royalties without even a complaint being filed is likely 
somewhat higher, but I suspect the total number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty 
(as opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued patents."). 
 61. See Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L., 
511, 523 (2006) (presenting the use of a cost-benefit in situations of extreme uncertainty). 
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amount of systemic legal uncertainty in an inventive area can depress 
development.  As the Court said, "‘[T]he limits of a patent must be 
known’ . . . otherwise, a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and 
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would 
discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the 
field."62  In other words, even without knowledge of particular uncertain 
patent claims, simply operating in an environment of suspected endemic 
patent uncertainty can encumber innovation.63 
C.  Relationship Between Clear Legal Boundaries and Growth 
While patent uncertainty seems to dampen investment, by contrast, 
economic research suggests a general relationship between clear legal 
boundaries and increased economic growth.64  Scholars have suggested that 
research to this effect from the real property realm can be helpful as a 
(limited) analogy to the scope uncertainty issues in the intellectual property 
realm.  It is generally thought that in property-rights systems, extensive 
uncertainty as to scope of legal rights leads to increased transaction costs 
and decreased investment.65 
In the real property domain, much has been written about the 
importance of public, certain, and easily accessible titles and deeds in 
facilitating economic development.66  With respect to land, the boundaries 
of real property are precisely described by the "metes and bounds" of the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (quoting Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) and United Carbon Co. v. 
Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)). 
 63. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998) (discussing the 
effect patent monopolies have on increasing prices to investors in hopes of encouraging 
invention). 
 64. See Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets:  The Role of Contract 
and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 395 (1993) ("The policies of both contract and 
property law aim at reducing peoples’ planning costs and transaction costs.  Planning is 
facilitated by rules that remove, as much as possible, ambiguities and legal risks in the 
relationships."). 
 65. Id. at 395–97. 
 66. See, e.g., Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records:  A Model for Action, 
24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 289 (2002) (stating that recording promotes efficiency and 
economic development). 
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land as delineated in the deed.  In modern day deeds, it is possible to 
precisely fix the outer boundaries of properties using global positioning 
coordinates.67  Even if third parties do not actually inspect real property 
deeds before investing, they can have confidence that the boundary 
demarcation mechanisms used are precise.  Such knowledge of precision of 
boundary rights results, in turn, in general confidence that transaction costs 
in determining boundaries should be low if a dispute does arise. 
Empirical research has linked precision and certainty of boundaries in 
the real property realm to improved economic development.68  By contrast, 
countries with inadequate institutions and rules for promoting public notice 
as to boundaries in real property tend to exhibit stunted investment, 
development, and planning.69  The increased legal uncertainty translates 
into increased transaction costs and ultimately serves to inhibit net 
investment.70 
Although the analogy to real property law has its limits, there are 
reasons to believe that there are similar dynamics in patent law.  All things 
being equal, we would expect decreased investment, planning, research, 
and development in new technologies when inadequate certainty exists 
about the scope of existing patent rights.  Conversely, when third-party 
firms have more certainty about their potential patent infringement liability, 
there will likely be increased investment.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has said, "If competitors cannot be certain about a patent’s extent, they may 
be deterred from engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or 
they may invest by mistake in competing products that the patent 
secures."71 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Peter H. Dana, Global Positioning System Overview, UNIV. OF COLO. (May 1, 
2000) http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/notes/gps/gps_f.html (last visited Sept. 13, 
2011) (stating that differential carrier phase GPS tracking can achieve surveying accuracy 
from 1 mm to 1 cm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 77 (linking Britain’s Industrial Revolution 
to the establishment of clear private property rights, more predictable courts and police, and 
limitations on confiscatory taxation). 
 69. See id. at 81 (citing a study finding that the quality of a nation’s property rights 
institutions has a strong, positive correlation to economic growth). 
 70. See id. at 39–45 (discussing that the regulation of property law minimizes costs by 
decreasing the information burden).  A properly functioning property system will encourage 
investment and trade, but, if the system is not implemented well, then disputes arise and 
cause increased costs.  Id. at 45; see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 
(2000). 
 71. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33 
(2002) (addressing the issues stemming from the uncertainty of a patent claim’s extent). 
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Patent boundaries cannot be as precise as deeds in lands.72  
Nonetheless, the analogy is useful because, even absent precise claim scope 
certainty, relatively more certain patent claim boundaries would yield more 
overall investment in socially productive usages such as research and 
development and relatively fewer outlays toward legal transaction costs.  
As Bessen and Meurer have argued, overall uncertainty about patent rights 
likely imposes significant costs on third-party development, and those costs 
would be more productively redirected in environments of patent scope 
certainty.73  The legal uncertainty of an ambiguously scoped patent can act 
like an industry-wide tax on the cost of invention, which all firms bear.  
This sum of these external costs may outweigh any social benefit brought 
by the patented invention. 
D.  Opportunistic Behavior from Patentees 
Uncertainly scoped claims also incentivize opportunistic behavior on 
the part of patent holders.  Such uncertainty can produce problematic 
externalities:  private benefits for the patent holder but costs that are borne 
externally by other firms and the public.  Recall that some uncertainly 
scoped patents exist ex ante in a probabilistic range of interpretive scopes.  
Some patent holders strategically exploit the ex ante uncertainty of claim 
language by suing (or threatening to sue) through the entire range of a 
claim’s prima facie scope, irrespective of actual validity or coverage.74  
Once issued, patent claims receive a legal presumption of validity, and it is 
often quite expensive to invalidate an issued patent claim. 
Some patentees deliberately take advantage of the high cost of 
invalidation by invoking overly broad, but potentially invalid, 
                                                                                                                 
 72. The analogy is limited because, unlike in real property, the boundaries of patents 
are not precisely fixed using global positioning coordinates.  Rather, patent rights are 
described by the vagaries of words.  To continue with our real property analogy, let us 
imagine that even if deeds were publically available, they designated property boundaries 
using impermanent, movable landmarks, or that the level of precision was in miles, rather 
than the needed feet or inches.  We would imagine knowledge among real property 
developers of such endemic imprecision would have a depressive effect on property 
development.  Thus, although the real property analogy is instructive as a theoretical goal, 
such precise boundary definition may be elusive in patent law. 
 73. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 67. 
 74. Id. at 6 (discussing the E-Data patent infringement case). 
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interpretations.  This allows patentees, for example, to threaten suit over 
technologies that the patentee never actually invented, but which fall under 
some subset of plausible interpretations given the literal language of the 
claims.  Some commentators have found this particularly common in patent 
infringement suits by non-practicing entities.  Even without such 
opportunism, run-of-the-mill patentees often benefit from the flexibility 
permitted by ex ante scope uncertainty to selectively adjust their asserted 
scope to navigate invalidity and infringement obstacles before and during 
litigation.75 
E.  Some Social Benefits of Scope Uncertainty 
Having focused on the costs of patent scope uncertainty, it is also 
important to note some benefits.  First, it is often difficult and costly for 
patentees to precisely define the boundaries of their claims ex ante.  
Leaving some claims imperfectly defined can be seen as an efficient use of 
a patent applicant’s limited resources.76  Second, patents drawn with rigidly 
defined boundaries may undercompensate patentees in future infringement 
proceedings.77  The patent system aims, as a general goal, to reward patent 
holders proportionately to their inventive contribution to society.  However, 
undercompensation may occur if rigidly defined patent boundaries do not 
cover competitors’ future products employing the patentee’s inventive 
concept.   
Overall, it would be undesirable to have a patent system that is 
perceived by inventors to systematically undercompensate them relative to 
their inventive contribution.  Most clearly, the "doctrine of equivalents" is a 
process aimed at addressing the underinclusion problem inherent in rigidly 
defined categories.  However, we can consider patent scope uncertainty as 
another, albeit more informal, means to approach the same problem.  
Uncertainty in the scope of a claim often has the functional benefit of 
allowing judges the ex post flexibility to adjust their interpretive decisions 
to proportionally match the underlying inventive contribution. 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 946, 980 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (noting that parties shift in claim construction positions during litigation caused a 
"clear inequity"). 
 76. See Hubbard, supra note 10, at 341–43. 
 77. Id. (noting the difficulties inherent in writing patents to extend future technology). 
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In this way, scope uncertainty can have an indirect public value.  
Nonetheless, I believe this benefit is far outweighed by the total costs such 
uncertainty engenders.  This Article suggests that there are more 
straightforward, efficient, and narrowly tailored approaches to achieving a 
similar ex post flexibility for the occasional case of severe 
undercompensation due to underinclusive patent scope. 
F.  A Theoretical Model Can Improve Scope Certainty 
The scope of a patent claim, and public notice as to that claim’s 
boundaries, are linked to claim interpretation.  This subpart provides a brief 
overview of such procedures as a link to the next Part, which more deeply 
probes the problem of patent scope uncertainty.  
During a typical patent infringement lawsuit, a patent-holder (usually 
the plaintiff) alleges that a patent claim covers a tangible product 
manufactured, used, or sold by the defendant.78  The product that is being 
compared to the patent claim is called the "accused device."  Because we are 
comparing the element words79 of a particular patent claim to a real-world 
product or process during much of the infringement analysis, the 
interpretation of the claim language is crucial.  Claim construction is the 
phase of litigation in which the presiding judge interprets and establishes the 
official meaning of patent claim words for the purposes of the lawsuit.80  
These interpretations become important because the finder of fact (usually the 
jury) is required to employ these meanings in its infringement determination. 
Words are capable of multiple meanings and may possess broader or 
narrower scopes of meaning.  Because multiple interpretations are possible, it 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Eifion Phillips, Phillips v. AWH Corp.:  Reemphasizing Context in Patent 
Claim Construction, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 957, 958 (2006) (defining claim construction as the 
act of "determining the meaning and scope of the claims of a patent"). 
 79. A patent claim is a single sentence.  It is divided into distinct parts termed 
"limitations" or "elements."  An element may consist of a single word or a group of words.  
For simplicity, I will use "claim words" and "claim terms" interchangeably with elements in 
the body of the text.  As I discuss later, the division of a claim into elements is itself a 
nuanced process.  
 80. Note that claim construction interpretations for the same claim are not typically 
binding from one infringement case to another involving that same claim.  However, 
previous interpretations, if in context, can be highly influential.  See Peter Menell, Matthew 
Powers & Steven Carlson, Patent Claim Construction:  A Modern Synthesis and Structured 
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 775–80 (2010). 
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is often ex ante legally uncertain whether the words of a patent claim cover a 
particular accused device or process.  For example, consider a word in a 
patent claim with two equally plausible dictionary meanings.  Under one 
potential interpretation, a claim may clearly cover the accused device at issue 
in an infringement case, and under the other, the accused device may clearly 
fall outside the claim.  To use a well-known example:  Imagine a patent claim 
whose words describe a technology involving a "board."81  Imagine that the 
accused device being sold by the defendant involves a synthetic, rather than a 
wooden, board.  Depending upon the chosen definition, the term "board" is 
variously capable of covering only wooden, or both wooden and synthetic, 
boards. 
In many cases, the selection of one interpretation over others will be 
dispositive on the ultimate issue of patent infringement.  If the judge selects 
an interpretation that clearly puts the accused device outside of the patent 
claim, no literal infringement can be found.82  A significant number of patent 
infringement cases will therefore be disposed of shortly after claim 
construction by motions for summary judgment, eliminating the need for an 
infringement trial.83  For this reason, the claim construction process has 
become one of the most important, if not the most important, phase of the 
patent infringement lawsuit.84 
The ability of third parties to alter behavior ex ante to avoid 
infringement is partly contingent on their ability to accurately predict the 
scope of coverage of claim words in a future infringement proceeding.  As I 
will argue in the sections that follow, the prediction’s certainty is partially 
dependent upon the quality of the information being interpreted—such as the 
scope-defining information in the patent document—and partially on the 
rules and procedures followed by district court judges in claim construction 
proceedings.85 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See Nystrom v. TREX Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1111–12 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing 
the meaning of the claim term "board"). 
 82. Literal infringement of a claim occurs when every limitation or element in the 
patent claim at issue is found in the accused device.  See Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("If any claim limitation is absent from 
the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter of law."). 
 83. EDWARD MANZO, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6:1 
(2009). 
 84. Not all claim words are necessarily construed by the presiding judge—some lay 
terms may be directly interpreted and applied by the ultimate finder of fact, usually the jury, 
during the infringement determination. See Menell et al., supra note 80, at 730–33. 
 85. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), 
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In sum, firms can incur substantial direct or indirect costs due to patent 
claims of uncertain scope.  Some research has hinted that these external costs, 
when multiplied across numerous third-party firms and multiple active 
claims, might outweigh any benefits induced by these patent claims.  With 
this calculus in mind, the next Part will begin a theoretical model of the scope 
uncertainty problem.  The goal will ultimately be to develop strategies for 
changing patent procedures likely to produce patent claims of generally more 
certain scope. 
III. Patent Scope and Legal Uncertainty 
A.  Claim Scope Uncertainty:  A More Rigorous View 
As indicated, current patent procedures permit claims whose scopes 
range from the well-defined to the relatively poorly defined.  This Part 
clarifies patent scope issues through the lens of broader concepts of legal 
uncertainty.  It develops a theoretical (and idealized) metric representing a 
patent claim of perfect scope certainty.  A claim will meet this theoretical 
standard if a lay interpreter of the claim is able to, on the basis of the 
interpretive information provided, classify the "universe" of potentially 
accused products as either infringing or non-infringing with legal certainty.  
This theoretical ideal serves as a useful reference for articulating the various 
sources of patent scope uncertainty.  On this metric, "patent scope 
uncertainty" decomposes into the different ways in which actual patent 
claims fall short of this scope-certainty ideal. 
This Part uses this framing to identify sources of claim-scope 
uncertainty that are potentially more foreseeable, and hence more preventable 
than others.86  The premise is that many87 common claim-scope issues are not 
                                                                                                                 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ("[C]ompetitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement 
litigation occurs, that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text of the patent and its 
associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and . . . arrive at the 
true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights . . . ."). 
 86. Notably, this Part seeks neither to eliminate nor to frame it as achievable or 
efficient the reduction of all uncertainty in claim scope.  Rather, it focuses upon a set of 
uncertain scenarios common under our current procedures that might be efficiently reduced 
by increasing particular types of information. 
 87. It is an empirical question what percentage of scope uncertainty issues can be 
attributed to ordinary underdetermination.  As far as I am aware, there have not yet been 
studies classifying patent claims in terms of relative scope certainty and the reasons they 
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of the intractable sort but rather the result of routine 
"underdetermination."88  Underdetermination refers to scenarios where a 
patentee could have supplied scope-defining information that would have 
mitigated the scope issues in a class of relevant cases, but did not.  
Particularly problematic are claim scope interpretive decisions made upon 
implicit, rather than explicit, information (e.g., limits on claim scope 
inferred contextually from the specification). 
1. Literal Scope Versus Non-Literal Scope of Patent Claims 
Before addressing the more complex issue of claim scope uncertainty, 
it is helpful to first consider the more basic concept of patent claim scope. 
The scope of a patent claim is a reference to the extent, and implicitly the 
bounds, of a claim’s legal rights.  A patent holder has the right to employ 
legal remedies to exclude others, for example, from selling products 
covered by a given claim.  Thus, questions of patent scope, as references to 
legal rights, should be framed analytically through the lens of a hypothetical 
patent infringement lawsuit.  The scope—the coverage of a claim—will be 
what the claim is held to encompass in a putative patent infringement 
proceeding involving the claim at issue. 
One can separate patent scope into two conceptually distinct 
aspects—literal and non-literal scope—guided by the doctrinal structure 
of patent infringement.  Substantive infringement analysis is divided into 
two distinct phases:  literal infringement and infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.89  During the process of literal infringement the 
                                                                                                                 
might be considered uncertain in any given infringement suit.  This is a useful area for future 
empirical exploration.  Informally and non-scientifically, one can readily find 
underdetermination issues in reported district and Federal Circuit claim construction 
decisions.  Such examples are not statistically valid due to selection bias and other lack of 
comprehensiveness issues, but at a minimum they suggest that the issue is reasonably 
prevalent.  For some recent reported examples, see Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and United Coin Machine Co. v. Ardent Progressive Systems & 
Games, LLC, No. 3:08-CV-0466-LRH-RAM, 2010 WL 3257858 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 88. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) ("The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given 
case if and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is 
a nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results."). 
 89. See Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 424 F.3d 
1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("To prove direct infringement, the plaintiff must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more claims of the patent read on 
the accused device literally or under the doctrine of equivalents." (citing Advanced 
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jury90 compares the meaning of the patent claim term elements to the 
particular "accused product"91 that is the subject of infringement.92  Literal 
(or prima facie) patent scope is thus a function of the outcome of this literal 
infringement analysis.  If the finder of fact finds no literal infringement, it is 
asked to consider the claim and accused product under a distinct analysis—
the doctrine of equivalents (DOE)—which considers accused products 
outside the literal meaning of the claim terms but sharing substantial 
functional similarity.93  Infringement under the DOE would constitute a 
claim’s "non-literal" scope. 
This Article is primarily focused on the literal scope inquiry because 
of its ex ante orientation.94  In this usage, ex ante refers to the time period 
after a patent is issued but before any actual patent infringement 
proceeding.  The defining feature of the ex ante period, as contrasted with 
the ex post period, is that legal uncertainty about claim scope, meaning, or 
infringement has yet to be authoritatively resolved.  Ex post thus refers to 
the period after which a legal official95 has authoritatively interpreted and 
                                                                                                                 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).  
A literal infringement occurs when an accused product possess all elements set forth in a 
claim.  Id. (citing Franks Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., 389 
F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  In contrast, "[t]he doctrine of equivalents allows the 
patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the 
original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes."  Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002). 
 90. By default, literal infringement is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.  Of 
course, parties can agree to a bench trial where the finder of fact is the judge. 
 91. The points are most clearly illustrated by reference to physical objects. Thus, for 
simplicity, I will focus my analysis on patent "product," rather than process, claims. The 
principles apply to process claims as well.  Utility patents are often classified into two major 
categories:  product patents and process patents.  As the name suggests, a product patent 
claims actual physical objects such as machines or molecules.  In contrast, a process patent 
claims methods or steps for accomplishing some task.  Process patents normally require a 
description at a higher level of abstraction.  Section 101 provides a list of statutory 
patentable subject matter.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 92. The words of the patent claim have been sectioned in logically distinct "elements," 
and have usually been given an authoritative meaning by the presiding judge during claim 
construction. 
 93. The doctrine of equivalents queries whether the accused device employs 
"insubstantial alterations" that were not captured in the original claim. 
 94. Going forward my references to patent claim scope should be therefore read to 
refer to literal scope unless otherwise indicated. 
 95. Note that I use the term "legal official" rather broadly not just to refer to judges but 
to any legal role with the official capacity to resolve some legal uncertainty including juries, 
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determined the scope of the patent claim during the course of a patent 
infringement lawsuit.  Unlike literal infringement, infringement under the 
DOE has a decidedly ex post orientation because DOE analysis deliberately 
invites ex post discretionary consideration by juries.  This Article focuses 
on literal scope because increasing certainty about claim scope and 
coverage requires an ex ante (pre-litigation) orientation. 
If our concern is legal notice, then the analytical posture should reflect 
the perspective of a lay interpreter—a non-official.  This is important to 
clarify because there are several classes of interpreters of patent claims—
lay (third) parties (e.g., competing firms), legal officials (e.g., judges, juries, 
and examiners), and patent applicants themselves.  The lay view considers 
patent scope from the standpoint of an objective third party attempting to 
determine the boundaries of an issued claim.  Scope uncertainty will be 
related to the potential divergence between the predictions of scope by such 
lay observers and any eventual, authoritative determination of scope by a 
legal official during a proceeding.  Because patent scope issues are little 
different from scope-of-law issues arising elsewhere in law, it is helpful to 
look to the broader scholarship on legal scope for conceptual grounding. 
2.  Scope Is About Boundaries and Function 
One can understand scope-of-law issues through at least two distinct 
analytical frameworks: one oriented upon boundaries and the other upon 
function.  In one sense, the scope of any legal right, including a patent 
claim, concerns the demarcation of legal boundaries.  Within law the term 
"legal scope" refers to both the coverage and non-coverage of a given law.96  
The concept of scope suggests that application of a given legal rule will be, 
in some sense, limited.  To reference a law’s scope is to imply that a law 
will not apply to all future entities, objects, and behaviors, but to some 
limited subset.97  From that perspective, legal scope is related to the 
substantive criteria by which we differentiate, ex ante, the subset of legal 
actors, objects, behaviors, and states that will be subject to a law’s 
                                                                                                                 
trial or appellate judges, ALJs, and others. 
 96. Russell L. Weaver, Retroactive Regulatory Interpretations:  An Analysis of 
Judicial Responses, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1986). 
 97. For a highly readable introduction to such a framework for thinking about laws 
and regulation, see PATRICK MCFADDEN, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS:  
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 2–5 (2001). 
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differential treatment or legal consequences.98  A scope boundary is the 
"line" distinguishing that which is covered by a law from that which is not.  
In this sense, critiques of legal scope generally tend to focus upon 
demarcation of legal boundaries via the legal criteria chosen ex ante. 
 Within the patent claim context, questions of literal scope are, in many 
respects, similarly concerned with boundary-defining criteria.  A primary 
emphasis is on the claim words and interpretive information upon which a 
lay observer must rely to distinguish infringing products from non-
infringing products.99   
Legal scope can also be understood through a related but distinct 
functional definition.  In this orientation, we are not so concerned with legal 
boundaries for their own sake; rather we ask how well those boundaries 
perform their functional role of distinguishing specific identifiable entities 
or behaviors that violate a given law and are accordingly subject to its 
differential legal consequences.  This approach to scope directs us to 
decompose our abstract legal categories into particular legal entities and to 
make specific determinations as to whether they do or do not "violate" the 
criteria of the law.  Under this functional conception, one can characterize 
formal notice about patent scope by the extent to which the words of the 
patent claim establish boundaries that distinguish real-world objects 
covered by a patent claim from those that are not. 
This functional framing of patent claim scope highlights a key point—
claim scope is a relative formulation.  It is not sufficient to simply focus on 
the inadequacy of the claim-word boundaries in the abstract.  Rather, we 
must evaluate the scope of a patent claim by its ability to effectively 
classify the relevant universe of potentially accused products and to do so in 
a way that is not over- or underbroad.  Any inquiry into the sufficiency of 
the delineation of the patent claim’s scope should be considered relative to 
the class of accused devices potentially inside or outside its scope.  If we 
aim to critique a claim for having an uncertain scope, we should do so in 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Pierre Schlag observes that a typical law employs "legal distinctions"—ex ante 
descriptive legal categories, statuses, or criteria—to abstractly delineate the subset of entities 
and behaviors that will be governed by the law and subject to its differential consequences.  
See Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves:  An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal 
Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 948 (1988). 
 99. See Mullally, supra note 26, at 349 ("[T]he claims of the patent define a patentee’s 
property right, delineating what the patentee believes she has invented and is entitled to 
exclude all others from doing."). 
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relation to the class of products that may or may not potentially infringe.  
The heart of the scope inquiry is functional—to delineate and distinguish 
those products that literally infringe from those that do not.  The import of 
this functional and relational component of patent scope will be apparent 
later when exploring strategies for improving ex ante scope certainty. 
In sum, issues of patent claim scope are concerned with the set of 
technologies that are subject to the patent holder’s exclusive legal rights.  
As such, the analysis is best seen through the lens of a hypothetical patent 
infringement proceeding.  The literal scope of a claim is the outcome of the 
literal infringement analysis as ultimately interpreted by a judge and applied 
by a jury.  In this regard, we can express literal scope in two ways.  One 
perspective is focused on the claim terms and boundary-defining concepts.  
Another considers claim scope functionally, relative to the "universe" of 
accused products.  Together, one can understand ex ante literal scope more 
effectively by considering: (1) how well-defined and objective patent claim 
legal boundaries are, and (2) how certainly, ex ante, these boundaries 
distinguish those products that literally infringe from those that do not.  
B.  Defining Claim Scope Uncertainty 
Having described the concept of literal claim scope, we are now in a 
position to define claim scope uncertainty.  The goal of this exercise will 
ultimately enable us to identify the distinct ways by which patent claims are 
considered "uncertainly scoped."  I will suggest that we can approximately 
group these different sources of scope uncertainty into those that are 
difficult to avoid and those that can be improved. 
1.  A Theoretical Metric:  Perfect Scope Certainty 
The idea of claim scope uncertainty is usefully expressed by contrast 
to a hypothetical, theoretical ideal:  a patent claim whose scope we would 
consider perfectly certain.  What would it mean to have an idealized patent 
claim of perfect scope certainty?  One answer comes from our functional 
definition of patent scope.  Recall the functional definition, which queries 
how effectively a claim distinguishes the class of infringing products from 
the class of not infringing products.  Recall further that, for notice purposes, 
we are concerned with an ex ante, rather than an ex post, view of patent 
scope.  Therefore, an ideal patent claim of perfect scope would be one in 
EFFICIENT UNCERTAINTY IN PATENT INTERPRETATION 1767 
 
which every real-world product is, ex ante, unambiguously and objectively 
classified as infringing or not infringing that claim.  
A perfectly literally scoped patent claim would be one in which the 
objective interpretations of the claim elements are sufficiently precise so as 
to classify all potential accused devices ex ante as literally infringing or not.  
A claim of perfect literal scope would give rise to a set of objective, legally 
certain classification rules that would unambiguously resolve the issue of 
literal infringement ex ante when applied to any accused product.  Such a 
perfectly scoped claim is, of course, merely theoretical and unattainable in 
practice for reasons discussed shortly.  Nonetheless, the ideal will be 
helpful as a guide for the goal of improving claim scope certainty. 
2.  Characterizing Literal Claim Scope Uncertainty 
We can express the concept of patent scope uncertainty as a departure 
from our theoretical metric of perfect scope certainty.  An uncertainly 
scoped patent claim is one that falls short of the ideal.  Such a claim fails to 
fully differentiate the set of potential accused products as literally infringing 
or not.  A rough proxy of the degree of uncertainty is given by the size of 
the class of products that cannot be unambiguously classified in this way.  
As I will suggest later, of particular interest would be the group of products 
that are variants of included embodiments in the patents or foreseeable 
third-party products that seek to "invent around" the literal scope.  We can 
consider a claim literally uncertainly scoped if there is a significant 
percentage of relevant products that cannot be classified as literally 
infringing or not, given the patent scope. 
C.  Legal Uncertainty Through the Lens of a Legal Official 
We now have a working characterization of the literal scope 
uncertainty of a patent claim.  A claim will have a legally uncertain literal 
scope if the boundary-defining information provided in the public patent 
record fails to distinguish those products that literally infringe from those 
that do not, ex ante.  As this is a theoretical standard, all claims will likely 
suffer from uncertainty to some degree.  Of concern are those claims that 
are of highly uncertain scope relative to the relevant set of products. 
As a legal determination, the resolution of patent claim scope presents 
uncertainty issues of the type that routinely occur elsewhere in law.  Thus, 
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to illuminate the sources of patent scope uncertainty, it will be helpful to 
have a broader model of legal uncertainty importing existing views on the 
topic.  In this section I will present one characterization of legal uncertainty 
that I will subsequently apply to issues of patent scope uncertainty.100 
1.  One View of Legal Uncertainty  
As Oliver Wendell Holmes and others have argued, we should 
ultimately conceive of legal rights through the lens of the predicted 
conclusions of legal officials because officials are those who are officially 
empowered to authoritatively resolve legal uncertainties.101  Drawing upon 
different strands from the works of H.L.A. Hart,102 Duncan Kennedy,103 and 
Frederick Schauer,104 we can paint a characterization of "legal uncertainty" 
in terms of the choices and constraints on the part of legal officials in the 
range of outcomes in a given legal determination. 
In one sense, ex ante legal uncertainty is a function of the ex post 
options available to legal officials in light of constraints on these outcomes.  
                                                                                                                 
 100. Perhaps ironically, the concept of legal uncertainty is itself uncertain.  There is no 
unitary, agreed-upon definition of the notion of legal uncertainty.  It shares a great degree of 
similarity, or is perhaps considered identical, to the Critical Legal Studies concept of "legal 
indeterminacy" or H.L.A. Hart’s concept of "open texture."  For a discussion of legal 
indeterminacy, see generally Anthony D’Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any 
Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513 (1989) (exploring various legal theories and 
why no theory is inherently capable of constraining judicial decisions).  For a discussion of 
open texture, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121–31 (1961) (defining "open 
texture" as the point at which general rules communicating standards of behavior become 
indeterminate).  The family resemblance shared by all of these concepts is that there is no 
clear, definitive answer that is likely to be widely agreed upon, either by the disputants or an 
authoritative decision maker ex ante. 
 101. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts:  The Path 
of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 700 (1998) (explaining that the 
job of lawyers is to predict how the law will apply to their clients; thus it is essential to 
understand how courts arrive at their judgments). 
 102. See generally Hart, supra note 12. 
 103. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1147 (studying legal arguments and classifying 
their reoccurring patterns).  Implicit in this idea of correlative legal arguments and the 
availability of multiple legal arguments is this characterization of legal uncertainty. 
 104. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 518–21 (1988) (discussing 
how judges often have choices among rules to apply to given situations, even when they 
appear constrained by a formal rule, and how judges can often escape the seemingly 
mandated formal conclusion of a rule by justifying the application or creation of an 
alternative, plausibly acceptable rule). 
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Consider the common scenario in which a legal official, such as a judge, is 
presented with some ex ante legally uncertain and contested point of law, 
fact, or outcome to resolve.  In such a case, there are typically formal 
constraints (like the text of an applicable statute) that might partially 
constrain the outer range of possible outcomes.  Under this mode, to state 
that there is legal uncertainty is simply to imply that there are multiple, 
plausible legal arguments surrounding that point of law or fact, even given 
any formal constraints.105  There is legal uncertainty from the perspective of 
the lay observer because, ex post, a legal official may reasonably elect from 
any one of the plausible options or arguments presented.106 
By contrast, "legal certainty" is often used in the sense of "legal 
determinacy" and describes situations where there is only one plausible 
argument (or option), and therefore only one reasonable conclusion, that 
could be reached by a legal decision maker.107  Legal uncertainty is partially 
linked to the degree to which the legal decision makers are or are not 
constrained in their range of choices in applying laws and arriving at legal 
outcomes. 
There are two clarifying points to be made.  First, even when there are 
constraints, such as statutes, that are on point and restricting the outer 
bounds of a legal official’s options, there may still be a high degree of ex 
ante uncertainty as to any particular legal outcome due to a large range of 
ex post options still available within those bounds.108  Explicit, on-point 
legal rules can still have open-texture legal categories at a high level of 
abstraction or discretion (e.g., "reasonable").  Such criteria still leave such a 
large range of ex post discretion so as to engender considerable ex ante 
uncertainty.  Moreover, as Kennedy, Schauer, and Pierre Schlag have 
noted, legal officials often have the ability to avoid undesired outcomes, 
                                                                                                                 
 105. This is consistent with a common, colloquial usage of legal uncertainty in the law.  
See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990, 995 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) ("The matter is, as the Court of Appeals conceded, ‘fairly disputed.’. . . 
It is legally uncertain. . . .  And only this Court can provide an authoritative answer."). 
 106. For illustrative purposes, let us assume for the moment that all of the outcomes are 
"equally plausible."  We can relax this assumption later, as clearly some legal arguments are 
at times more likely than others. 
 107. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the 
Problem of Legal Determinacy?, 16 RATIO JURIS 281, 281 (2003) ("A persistent topic in 
modern legal philosophy is that of legal (in)determinacy: the question of whether there 
are . . . unique right answers—to legal questions . . . ."). 
 108. Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 410–16 (1985). 
1770 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011) 
despite formal constraints that superficially appear determinative.109  A 
judge might, for example, be empowered to craft exceptions to an otherwise 
constraining statute, find a different but plausible applicable statute, avoid a 
decision, or craft an outcome on different doctrinal or statutory grounds.  
Thus, in some legal contexts, officials are not necessarily as constrained in 
their outcomes by formal constraints as it might appear on the surface. 
Such limits notwithstanding, this model of uncertainty in terms of 
official options in light of constraints has significant resonance in legal 
logic and practice.  The familiar concept of a "legal point" being "at issue" 
captures this characterization.  If, under the circumstances, there really is 
only one legal argument that can be plausibly advanced around a legal or 
factual issue, then it is common to say that the point of law or fact is not "at 
issue" under typical modes of objective legal analysis.  This notion of 
uncertainty as "choice among arguments" is also deeply embedded in law 
school curriculum.  A typical pedagogical goal is to imbue within law 
students the judgmental capacity to assess which potential points of law or 
fact are "at issue" or are plausibly arguable within a factual context.110 
This idea is also reflected in the logic of current legal practice.  Under 
the doctrine of "judgment as a matter of law," a judge is justified in 
deciding a particular issue normally reserved for the jury when "the 
evidence . . . leaves open to the rational fact-finder only one conclusion on 
the issue."111  Similarly, litigants rarely expend effort arguing points of law 
or fact for which there are no good arguments (or options for legal officials) 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal 
Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 787–90 (1996) (describing the various opportunities 
available for judges to act strategically in ruling on an issue and the range of attitudes judges 
and their clerks take toward these opportunities). 
 110. See, e.g., RICHARD FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE:  HOW TO EXCEL 
ON LAW SCHOOL EXAMS 117–28, 143–46 (1999) (offering guidance on how to spot issues 
and how to wisely budget limited time in an exam setting, disposing of less contentious 
issues quickly and saving time for issues requiring more in-depth analysis).  This is the heart 
of "legal issue spotting," the standby format for law school exams.  Id.  Perhaps the biggest 
mistake committed by first-year law students on a typical issue-spotter exam is to spend time 
analyzing potential points of fact or law that are not "at issue"—or reasonably legally 
uncertain—under the fact pattern presented.  Id. 
 111. Laferriere v. Paradis, 293 A.2d 526, 528 (Me. 1972); see also Volvo Cars of N. 
Am., LLC v. United States, 571 F.3d 373, 381 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[J]udgment as a matter of 
law is proper only when ‘there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper 
judgment.’" (quoting United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 
305 (4th Cir. 2009))). 
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on either side.112  Finally, we see that the notion of a "dispositive" legal 
argument contains this same basic logic.  A legal argument is dispositive 
when its presence essentially eliminates all other contending arguments 
with respect to an issue of law or fact.113  The essential idea of relative legal 
certainty is that the legal official is informally or formally constrained in his 
ultimate determination, and thus outcomes are relatively more predictable 
from the perspective of a lay observer ex ante. 
This characterization of ex ante legal uncertainty is necessarily 
stylized but nonetheless captures some intuitive aspects of legal uncertainty.  
In some sense, the magnitude of legal uncertainty can be aptly characterized 
by the number of equally reasonable outcomes or options that might be 
pursued by a legal official ex post.  For the moment, let us put aside 
concerns with defining the precise contours of "plausibility" or with the 
idea that not all legal arguments and options have equal strength or 
probability.114  While there is force to these objections, our simplified, 
informal model of legal uncertainty is sufficient to usefully illuminate 
analogous problems in the patent scope context.115 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Litigants will sometimes argue points of law or fact for which there are not strong 
arguments on both sides for various strategic and appeal-related reasons. 
 113. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "dispositive" as 
"being a deciding factor; (of a fact or factor) bringing about a final determination"); see also 
State v. Oliver, 30 S.W.3d 363, 364 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ("An issue is dispositive when 
this court must either affirm the judgment or reverse and dismiss." (citing State v. Wilkes, 
684 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984))). 
 114. Under the classical model of probability, all outcomes of an event are assumed to 
have an equal chance of occurring.  The paradigmatic example of a phenomenon accurately 
described by the classic model is the roll of a die, in which there is an equal probability of 
any side landing face up.  More sophisticated views of probability complicate the classical 
model and take into account that differing probabilistic events have different chances of 
occurring.  However, for many purposes, especially pedagogical, the classical model is 
sufficient. 
 115. See MATTHIAS KLATT, MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT:  THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL 
ARGUMENTATION 41–42 (2008) (discussing Karl Larenz’s application of this notion to the 
interpretation of words).  In particular, Klatt notes that, "[a]ccording to Larenz, drawing 
precise limits remains impossible, yet ‘in the overwhelming majority of all cases’ it can be 
clearly shown whether a statement lies outside the meaning of a term."  Id. at 42. 
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D.  Sources of Patent Scope Uncertainty 
It is helpful to apply the model of legal uncertainty in terms of 
"constraint and choice" to the problem of patent claim scope uncertainty.  A 
claim with an uncertain scope ex ante is one in which legal officials will 
have multiple options about the scope ex post.  In the patent context, legal 
officials are often not seeking flexibility in outcomes but rather are looking 
for objective indicia and guidance to objectively direct their claim 
interpretation and application decisions.116 
However, in a significant number of cases, the existing constraints on 
claim scope simply do not sufficiently narrow the outcomes to the level of 
precision needed to meaningfully direct the issue of literal infringement.  Ex 
ante variation in interpretive range often makes claim scope more uncertain 
ex ante than it theoretically needs to be.  A lay interpreter (such as a third-
party firm) cannot classify ex ante the universe of accused products as 
infringing or not if that observer cannot know ex ante how the claim will be 
authoritatively interpreted ex post by a legal official.  This is the problem of 
underdetermination—imprecision leads to multiple interpretive scopes and 
creates uncertainty about ultimate legal scope.  This subpart will consider 
the various ways in which actual patent claims tend to fall short of the 
theoretical ideal of perfect claim scope certainty, with a particular view of 
scope uncertainty as a function of ex post claim interpretation choices.  
1.  A Patent Claim Is a Classification Rule 
One can articulate the contours of claim scope uncertainty by reference 
to our theoretical metric of perfect scope certainty.  Patent claims can be 
considered uncertain for the various reasons by which they fall short of this 
theoretical metric.  Recall that such a perfectly scoped claim would permit 
an objective interpreter to classify ex ante all potentially accused products 
as literally infringing or not.  It is therefore analytically helpful to consider 
a patent claim as representing a "classification rule." 
A patent claim is a classification rule in the sense that a jury will 
ultimately be asked to make a classification based upon the claim’s 
interpreted meaning as to whether a specific accused device infringes.  In 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(emphasizing the importance of considering the patent claim and language in context rather 
than in a vacuum). 
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this way, we can use the phrases "claim meaning" and "claim classification 
rule" interchangeably, with this usage meant to highlight the functional role 
that will ultimately be played by a claim’s meaning.  The ex ante range of a 
patent claim’s literal scope will be based upon whatever classification rules 
can plausibly be derived from that claim based upon the patent and 
interpretive doctrine.   
To understand this "classification rule" approach to scope uncertainty, 
it is helpful to detail the doctrinal structure of literal patent infringement.  
Recall that under the literal infringement analysis, the jury compares a 
patent claim to one or more of the defendant’s accused products.  Before 
this occurs, there are typically some threshold issues.  Although a patent 
claim is written as one (often long) sentence, the doctrine first requires the 
judge to divide the patent claim into distinct subparts known as "elements" 
or "limitations."117  In the typical case, the judge also provides definitive 
interpretations for claim words to be used by the jury in the infringement 
decision.118 
According to the literal infringement doctrine, the jury then proceeds 
through the claim element by element.  For each element in the claim, the 
finder of fact must look to the accused device to determine whether there is 
a physical "part," "feature," or property of the accused device that literally 
corresponds to the meaning of a given element.119  Literal infringement can 
only be found when there is complete correspondence between the claim 
elements and "features" of the accused device.  If, for every element in the 
claim, there is a physical part or "feature" in the accused device that 
parallels that element, then there is literal infringement.120  If even one 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See MPEP, supra note 5, § 608.01(n)(B)(4) ("[T]he limitations or elements of each 
claim . . . must be considered separately."). 
 118. Such a definitive interpretation often proves dispositive on the issue of literal 
infringement.  For example, the judge may elect an interpretation that clearly excludes the 
defendant’s accused device from the literal scope. 
 119. See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 3:3, at 
3-7 (6th ed. 2010) ("The ‘elements’ of an apparatus claim are the main structural parts that 
together make up the combination claimed."). 
 120. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 40 (1997), 
rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (stating that the "essential inquiry" is whether 
"the accused product or process contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to each claimed 
element of the patented invention"). 
1774 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011) 
element in the claim cannot be found in the accused device, then there is no 
literal infringement.121 
This detail is important because it is helpful to consider claim scope at 
the element level rather than at the level of the claim as a whole.122  Each 
individual element represents its own classification rule.  In the literal 
infringement analysis, the jury is effectively applying "element-level" 
subrules in determining whether the accused product has a corresponding 
feature.  A perfectly scoped element would differentiate those accused 
products that have that element’s feature from those that do not.  The scope 
of the claim as a whole can be thought of as the combination of all of its 
constituent element-level subrules.  Thus, literal scope certainty will turn 
upon how well defined the individual elements are.  Any analysis aimed at 
improving ex ante notice will focus to a large degree upon whether the 
claim elements are defined with enough information to provide meaningful 
distinctions ex post relative to actual, accused objects. 
2.  Underdetermination and Scope Certainty 
What causes actual patent claims to fall short of delineating ex ante 
scope with perfect legal certainty?  There are many reasons, but one 
common pattern involves claim scope underdetermination.  As indicated 
earlier, underdetermination concerns scenarios where, ex ante, an 
objectively interpreted patent claim has a number of plausible interpretive 
scopes.  There is uncertainty about the outcome because a lay interpreter 
cannot know which, among many possible scopes, a judge will ultimately 
choose and a jury will ultimately apply. 
Although the range of possible interpretive scopes that a legal official 
may adopt can be wide, it is usually not unlimited.  Let us consider ways in 
which claim words tend to be bounded at their "outermost" edges.  Even if a 
claim element has a poorly defined scope ("attached to," for example), it is 
not necessarily un-scoped—we still may know some things that are clearly 
                                                                                                                 
 121. To give an overly simple example, the inventor of a windmill might characterize 
his invention in the following single-sentence claim:  "A windmill comprising a blade and a 
shaft."  If the composite elements are deemed by the judge to be "blade" and "shaft," the jury 
will look to the accused product—a physical windmill—to determine if that product has 
parts or characteristics that are (or are not) literally encompassed by the meanings of both 
elements—"blade" and "shaft." 
 122. See MPEP, supra note 5, § 608.01(n)(B)(4) ("[T]he limitations or elements of each 
claim . . . must be considered separately."). 
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outside the plausible range of the literal scope.123  The underdetermination 
problem is that such outer-edge bounding may not be sufficiently precise to 
provide the legal certainty that third-party firms frequently need to make ex 
ante literal infringement assessments. 
Let us consider the "outer most" scope of most claim terms through the 
lens of the patent interpretation doctrine.  We can think of a word’s scope 
as being successively narrowed by different limiting rules.  Absent a 
specific, contrary meaning,124 all words in legal decisions are implicitly 
bounded by the word’s possible, ordinary understandings.  If we have 
"encryption" as a claim term, we may not know what it means precisely, but 
we know that it does not mean "mountain."  Because there is no such 
plausible connotation, we can know with some certainty that a judge or jury 
will not employ such a meaning in an infringement proceeding. 
Patent doctrinal rules narrow the scope of a word further by the 
restriction that claim words be interpreted in accordance with how "a 
person of ordinary skill in the art" would have interpreted the word at the 
time of the invention.125  While this may further restrain possible scope, 
such a bound typically leaves a relatively wide range of plausible 
interpretive scopes ex ante.  Finally, at a high level, interpretive rules 
instruct to narrow claim word scope by the implicit and explicit restrictions 
arising when one reads the claim "in the context of the entire patent."126 
The underdetermination point is that even though these successive 
levels of restriction may narrow the outer interpretive scope to some degree, 
there are typically still relatively large ranges of plausible interpretations.  
Read together, these successive levels of constraints may narrow the 
interpretive range of given claim words like "encryption" or "board" quite 
significantly when compared to relatively unbounded and subjective terms 
such as "reasonable" or "aesthetically pleasing" that would be considered 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See KLATT, supra note 115, at 41–42 (discussing Karl Larenz applying this notion 
to interpretation of words and noting that, "according to Larenz, drawing precise limits 
remains impossible, yet in the ‘overwhelming majority of cases’ it can be clearly shown 
whether a statement lies outside the meaning of a term"). 
 124. Patentees, for example, can assign unusual or idiosyncratic meanings to claim 
words that differ from ordinary, colloquial usage.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that, while claim language can sometimes be 
understood by reference to its ordinary meaning, "patentees frequently use terms 
idiosyncratically"). 
 125. Id. at 1313. 
 126. Id. 
1776 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011) 
too indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112.127  However, scope 
underdetermination occurs when there are enough different interpretive 
scopes for a claim element, in light of the external and internal constraints, 
so as to create uncertainty as to the boundaries of a given claim.  In a patent 
claim covering a "board," the classification rule that emerges once applying 
the interpretive rules may not distinguish whether coverage is limited to 
"wooden boards" or covers "synthetic boards."  For this reason, relying on a 
superficially bounding default interpretive standard such as "plain and 
ordinary meaning in the art" may actually provide only illusory scope 
constraint relative to the needed precision, as multiple, plausible 
alternatives will often likely still remain.  
It is important to emphasize that such scope uncertainty is a relative 
concept.  How inadequate we believe the scope to be will be relative to the 
products that one needs to classify, ex ante, as infringing or not.128  To use a 
simple example, consider a claim with the element "motor vehicle" and 
imagine applying the typical scope narrowing constraints, such as "plain 
and ordinary meaning."  Such a minimally narrowed scope could still 
exhibit considerable ex ante uncertainty.  For example, imagine one 
interpretation suggesting that "motor" encompasses all motor vehicle 
motive technology.  Another objective, plausible reading might suggest 
restriction to only internal combustion motors (e.g., based upon internal 
combustion embodiments).  While there may not be scope uncertainty to 
the maker of an internal combustion engine, there may be uncertainty to the 
seller of a vehicle with an electric motor.  Such a lay interpreter may not be 
able to determine the claim’s literal scope ex ante because there are a range 
of plausible scopes that can be elected ex post by a judge.  If a product 
would infringe under one scope interpretation but not another, there will be 
scope uncertainty relative to that product. 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (concluding that "aesthetically pleasing" was indefinite because it failed to 
"particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the patentee regards 
as his invention"). 
 128. To illustrate this point using a fanciful example, consider an underdetermined (and 
indefinite) claim covering "beautiful, purple widgets."  Imagine further that it was only 
possible to produce white widgets and not purple widgets.  Even though we might consider 
such a subjective claim underdetermined in the abstract because "beautiful purple widgets" 
could give rise to a wide range of potential scope interpretations ex ante, it is sufficiently 
well-scoped in relation to the relevant set of products—white widgets. 
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a.  Underdetermination:  Multiple-Word Definitions or Scopes 
There are a few common scope underdetermination scenarios to 
highlight.  The first might be termed the "multiple meanings" pattern.  This 
occurs when a claim word can be plausibly interpreted in any of several 
distinct ways.  Such a scenario can arise where a claim term has several 
reasonably distinct dictionary definitions or usages in the art.  For example, 
the claim element "secured to" may have two distinct definitions: one that 
defines it as "firmly in place" and another that defines it as "directly 
attached to."129  The theoretical metric of perfect claim scope seems to 
require one, and only one meaning or classification rule per element.  If, ex 
ante, there are multiple equally plausible classification rules that are 
arguable, it will be difficult to predict which definition will ultimately 
prevail during infringement litigation.  This unpredictability will increase ex 
ante scope uncertainty. 
b.  Underdetermination:  Implicit Constraints on Scope 
Implicit scope constraints create a related problem.  A patentee’s legal 
rights arise from claims—the single-sentence, numbered paragraphs located 
at the end of the patent document.  However, the scope of these claims is 
often delineated by reference to other parts of the patent document, 
particularly the specification.130  This incongruity—defining the scope of 
patent claims by reference to differently purposed sections—can lead to 
scope ambiguities.  The problem is that the specification is often 
performing a functionally different role in patent law apart from claim 
scope delineation.  In the specification, the patentee is required to describe 
                                                                                                                 
 129. For a case raising similar issues, see Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Baldwin Filters, Inc., 
No. 09-CV-1049, 2011 WL 2183179 (D. Minn. June 6, 2011). 
 130. Technically, the "claims" are part of the specification, but most common colloquial 
usage separates the claims into their own distinct section and considers the specification to 
consist primarily of the written-description and enablement portions of the specification.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with 
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
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the claimed invention so as to identify it and enable others in the art to 
make and use it.  In many cases, the specification is only secondarily used 
for the purpose of narrowing the scope of a given claim element, and even 
then, this scope delineation is usually done only implicitly if at all.131 
Implicit constraints on claim scope—those inferred contextually in the 
specification—can lead to uncertainty issues.  First, it is difficult to know 
objectively the content and scope of implied constraints because the 
restrictions of such constraints are contextually inferred.  Implicit 
constraints, by definition, are not reified, explicit, and fixed.  Second, there 
is often a threshold issue of uncertainty as to whether such a constraint was 
intended to, and should be interpreted to, limit the literal scope of a claim 
term.  Continuing with the motor vehicle patent example, imagine that the 
specification summarizes the state of the art of internal combustion engines 
and how the claimed invention improves upon the state of the art.132  One 
might plausibly argue that the scope of the claim word "motor" is implicitly 
narrowed to combustion motors based upon repeated use in the 
specification.  However, it is not clear whether the usage in the 
specification should actually be read to modify the scope of the claim term 
because one can only infer such a restriction indirectly. 
Thus, even if one could plausibly assert that this implicit usage in the 
specification should be read as scope-defining restriction, since it is defined 
contextually through usage (and not reified as an explicit scope limitation), 
one cannot make an ex ante determination of the precise substance of the 
criteria that a jury will employ in a literal infringement decision.  Rather, 
the scope will be subject to a range of plausible interpretations suggested by 
the implicit usage.  For example, if we infer a constraint of "only internal 
combustion motors" based upon three included embodiments, all of which 
display internal combustion motors, we still do not know the precise scope 
of such an implicit constraint.  Should it be read to cover all versions of 
internal combustion motors or just the particular designs included?  Since 
such a constraint is implicit, similar scope issues will nearly always arise 
for implicit constraints unless explicitly clarified ex ante.  Nearly any time 
evidence is implicit rather than explicit there is the problem of a significant 
range of plausible arguments about the "true" objective ex ante meaning. 
                                                                                                                 
 131. The specification can perform an explicit claim word scope-defining role when the 
patentee includes its own definitions.  I will discuss this possibility in Part IV. 
 132. 35 U.S.C. § 112 typically is read to require a "Background of the Invention" 
section that summarizes the state of the art and how the claimed invention relates to that art. 
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Additionally, a word used in the process of describing the use of an 
invention may have a different or more limited goal than if the word had 
been used explicitly for the sole purpose of intentionally defining the 
word’s scope.  For example, the usage in the specification might refer to 
"internal combustion engines" because its primary purpose in that part of 
the document was to describe the existing state of the art, rather than to 
delineate a scope limitation.  Inferring constraints based upon usages other 
than scope-definition may lead to ambiguities concerning this use/scope-
delineation disparity.  Since many issues of legal uncertainty about scope 
arise from implicit constraints, explicitly disambiguating inferred 
constraints is a promising strategy. 
c.  Underdetermination:  Normalization of Implied Definitions 
Implicit constraints also tend to suffer from normalization problems.  
Ideally, if a patentee is defining the scope of a claim word in the 
specification there should be a clear and explicit link between the claim 
term and any constraint that is intended to delimit that claim word’s 
meaning.  A normalized claim definition would have an unambiguous link 
between scope limitation and claim word.  When constraints are implicit, 
there may not be such an explicit linkage, creating some ambiguity. 
To illustrate this point, consider that patents typically have multiple 
claims within a single patent document.  It is common for applicants to use 
the same words across multiple independent and dependent claims, as they 
are often describing different variants of the same invention.  Imagine there 
are five such claims, each employing the term "motor."  Further imagine 
that the word "motor" is potentially implicitly defined contextually in the 
specification as limited to "internal combustion motor."  There is a 
fundamental ambiguity here.  Even if we grant that the word "motor" is 
implicitly being limited in the specification, does this scope limitation apply 
to all of the distinct claims that use the word "motor" or simply to some 
subset of them?  Each separate claim bestows its own legal right to exclude, 
and it is consistent to employ different scopes for the same word across 
different patent claims in the document.  This lack of normalization—
explicit link between claim word and implied or explicit definition—creates 
another source of scope uncertainty. 
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E.  Underdetermination:  Precision Inadequacy 
Another underdetermination scenario might be termed the context of 
"inadequate scope precision."  Generally speaking, "precision" refers to the 
appropriate capacity to make distinctions at the level of detail required by 
the task at hand.133  This scenario is characterized by an element whose 
scope is not adequately demarcated, ex ante, for the types of infringement 
distinctions likely to be made.  Thus, even if one has "one" classification 
rule that can be derived from an element, the criteria provided by the rule 
might not be enough to resolve scope issues ex ante.  
A claim word can be imprecisely scoped if it inherently has a 
relatively high level of abstraction (e.g., "physical").134  More commonly, 
we simply consider a claim imprecisely scoped, if the scope-defining 
information provided in the patent document does not adequately allow one 
to definitively distinguish literal infringement among the relevant universe 
of potentially accused devices (e.g., "water-tight" for competitive products 
that can be either water-proof or water-resistant).135  Theoretically, these 
two scenarios are conceptually the same.  The imprecision issue occurs 
when the claim words, in the context of the patent document, still do not 
provide criteria that are adequately fine-grained to make ex ante literal 
infringement distinctions certain relative to the set of accused products.  
Rather, the words permit a wide range of scope interpretations, rendering 
infringement decisions uncertain from the perspective of a lay interpreter. 
F.  Underdetermination:  Element Divisions 
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have highlighted another 
underdetermination issue concerning the division of claims into "elements" 
during infringement.136  An element can be a distinct word or a group of 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/149667 ("The degree of refinement in a 
measurement, calculation, or specification. . . ."). 
 134. Internet Machs. LLC v. Alienware Corp., No. 6:10-cv-023, 2011 WL 2551295 
(E.D. Tex. June 24, 2011) (considering whether the scope of "interface" was limited to 
"physical interfaces" or included logical and non-physical interfaces). 
 135. Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp, 63 F. Supp. 2d 868, 870 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(construing "water-tight" to mean that no liquid would be admitted). 
 136. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 29, 51 (2005) (noting the seeming disconnect between the rhetorical 
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words, and there is no definitive way to tell ahead of time what words or 
group of words will constitute distinct elements.  Because the authoritative 
division of a claim into elements is only done ex post during litigation by 
the judge,137 ex ante third parties can only make educated guesses about the 
likelihood that individual words will constitute separate elements.  
Differences in grouping or separation of elements can lead to differences in 
scope and hence increase ex ante uncertainty about true scope.138 
G.  Scope Uncertainty Issues Difficult to Avoid 
The previous subparts indicated problems of underdetermination some 
of which may be mitigated by policies that explicitly disambiguate 
foreseeable sources of scope uncertainty.  Here I will briefly highlight 
sources of scope uncertainty that may be fundamentally difficult to avoid ex 
ante.  These sources are not the focus of this Article, as most deal with 
unforeseeable future scenarios or limitations inherent in language. 
The scope of a claim may become uncertain due to changes in 
technology.  There is a temporal problem in patent law.  We require 
patentees to define their legal boundaries at one point in time, yet patents 
persist over a twenty-year period.  During this period, technology may 
change or emerge in ways that were unpredictable at the time of drafting.  
Scope uncertainty may arise when one is asked to compare a given claim 
against after-arising, unforeseeable technologies.  The scope-defining 
                                                                                                                 
objectivity of patent claim elements and the reality of subjectivity).  District court judges are 
ultimately the ones who must determine which word or words in the claim constitute distinct 
"elements."  Id.  They critique the disparity that there is no definite means of determining, ex 
ante, what word or combinations of words in the patent claim constitutes a distinct and 
separate element for the purposes of infringement analysis.  Id. 
 137. A given claim is sometimes divided into logical parts, separated by commas, 
giving a semi-structure.  But this structure is implicit, and need not be followed by the 
presiding judge. 
 138. An analogous and perhaps unavoidable problem occurs relative to any accused 
product.  In the infringement analysis, the finder of fact compares the "elements" of the 
claim to the "features" of the accused device.  What is the proper division of the "features" of 
the accused device?  It may not be possible to divide the various parts and features of an 
accused product ex ante with any degree of certainty.  Take, for example,  a patent with a 
claim elements "attached windmill blades."  Imagine that our accused product is a windmill 
which has been made out of a unibody fiberglass structure.  How should the finder of fact 
divide up the parts of the accused device for comparison to the element?  Should the 
"unibody" blades be considered a separate element from the shaft? 
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boundaries fixed in the patent document may not provide adequate 
guidance for an unforeseeable product.  In significant cases, it may be 
desirable for legal officials to employ ex post discretion to avoid inadequate 
coverage for a given claim.  Similarly, pioneering patents often arise in 
emerging fields with underdeveloped vocabularies.  Such terminology may 
develop or change significantly in subsequent years.  Uncertainty may arise 
in applying a claim drafted in an era when a field’s expressive capacity was 
limited.  Scope problems of this nature may be difficult to avoid ex ante. 
There are also well-known "line-drawing" problems involving formal 
rules that are difficult to avoid on the margin.  Formal rules and categories 
tend to be both over and underinclusive relative to their underlying intent.  
This is well illustrated by H.L.A. Hart’s classic example of a law 
prohibiting vehicles in a public park.139  When lawmakers are required to 
reduce their intentions into formal categories such as "vehicles" to indicate 
a law’s scope, there are often unstated but implied limitations or expansions 
of the category’s plain scope.  For example, although this law superficially 
excludes all vehicles, it is likely that emergency vehicles, such as 
ambulances, form an unstated scope exception.  The category "vehicle," on 
its face, is thus overinclusive relative to the underlying intent for some 
marginal, non-paradigmatic types of vehicles. 
Similar inclusiveness issues can arise in patent claiming.  Patent rules 
require patentees to declare their patent claims, using categories to describe 
features or elements.  Requiring the decomposition of an invention into 
rigid categories can often mask the true complexity of the invention.  There 
might arise an accused device that does not fall within the scope of a 
claim’s categorical element, but which exhibits the technological features of 
the invention nonetheless.140  Similarly, products that are hybrids and that 
straddle category boundaries tend to create issues of legal uncertainty.141  
                                                                                                                 
 139. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
 140. Such underinclusion is the primary justification for infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents.  There is also the rarely employed "reverse" doctrine of equivalents 
which excludes overinclusion. 
 141. That legal categories present problems at the margin is well known to law 
professors and law students.  A common pedagogical approach in law school is to use 
hypotheticals that straddle the boundaries of legal categories.  For example, negligence law 
typically treats defendants differently if an accident that they caused was due to a physical 
disability (e.g., blindness) rather than a mental disability (e.g., schizophrenia). Compare 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965) (declaring that defendants with physical 
disabilities should be compared with a reasonable person having the same disability), with 
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Additionally, inventions are abstractions.  There are well-known limitations 
to expressing the contours of abstract concepts using language and 
drawings.  Uncertainty arises when legal officials seek to avoid the 
undesirable literal outcome of a rigid claim word.  Such an ex post 
divergence in outcome from expected literal coverage may lead to scope 
unpredictability from the perspective of a third party. 
Another source of unavoidable patent scope uncertainty arises from 
the aspects of patent infringement that are deliberately discretionary, and 
hence ex post in nature.  Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, for 
example, requires juries to determine if the accused device is "substantially 
the same" in various ways to the patent holder’s claimed invention.142  Such 
judgment-oriented legal criteria can make ex ante prediction of claim scope 
under the doctrine of equivalents somewhat more uncertain than literal 
scope.  Similarly, judges predisposed to employing "holistic" approaches to 
claim construction—interpretations that routinely avoid literal constraints in 
favor of contextual judgments—likely increase ex ante scope uncertainty.143  
Unpredictability, changing technology, marginal exceptions to rules, 
hybrid products, intentional ex post discretion, and the limitations of 
language—these are all issues of uncertainty that one cannot easily reduce.  
However, the argument is that many patent uncertainty problems are not of 
this intractable nature.  Rather, they involve more mundane issues of 
underdetermination that may be avoided through the provision of increased 
ex ante information.  To the extent we can construct patent definition and 
interpretation policies that produce claims with relatively fewer possible ex 
ante meanings, this would seem to translate into increased systemic scope 
certainty for patents generated under such procedures.  This is not to 
                                                                                                                 
id. § 283B (declaring that defendants with mental disabilities should be compared to a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances).  A law professor might illustrate this common 
pattern of legal uncertainty at the margin of a legal category by presenting a hypothetical 
involving a disability that could be characterized as either physical or mental depending 
upon the framing. 
 142. If no literal infringement is found by the jury, the jury is asked to determine 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  The standard is whether the accused device 
"performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the same 
result." Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 143. For a description of this holistic approach, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive 
Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 123, 
146–48 (2005). 
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suggest that uncertainty can be eliminated.  There will always be marginal 
line-drawing problems.  Rather, uncertainty can be reduced in common 
scenarios.  The Part that follows will pursue a more formal treatment of this 
intuition. 
IV.  Legal Uncertainty and Scope—A More Formal Approach 
A.  Set Theory as a Model of Legal Scope and Uncertainty 
In this Part, I will model the problem of patent-scope uncertainty more 
formally using the mathematical frameworks of set theory and constraint 
satisfaction.144  The model represents claim scope uncertainty by the set of 
plausible interpretations that a claim word can have in light of constraints 
that bound the meaning.  The larger the set of relevant interpretations, the 
more uncertainty about scope boundaries there will generally be.  One 
strategy for reducing uncertainty is to increase, in the public patent record, 
explicit constraints on meaning focused upon eliminating or disambiguating 
plausible interpretations employed ex post in infringement proceedings. 
The formal model highlights heuristics145 for mitigating scope 
uncertainty issues.  This framing allows us to identify general properties 
that are characteristic of constraints that limit claim scope ex ante.  These 
properties provide a standard against which we can compare existing patent 
interpretive rules and procedures in terms of their potential to constrain 
meaning.  For example, the metric will illustrate that the "plain and 
ordinary meaning in the art" interpretive standard is predisposed to 
inadequately restricting scope ex ante.  This model also enables us to 
consider marginal modifications to the patent definitional system likely to 
produce scope certainty benefits. 
                                                                                                                 
 144. I will describe these formal models primarily using "mathematical English" rather 
than formal equations.  The reason is to make the underlying logic of the model accessible to 
a largely non-technical audience.  Cf. ROBERT L. CAUSEY, LOGIC, SETS, AND RECURSION 2 
(2006) ("[Mathematical English] refers to the rigorous but somewhat informal style of 
presentation found in mathematics books and articles."). 
 145. Note that I am not arguing that the formal, theoretical maximum of certainty as 
described under set theory is either achievable or desirable in our actual patent system.  
Rather, the purpose of this model is to provide a theoretical standard to guide our thinking in 
considering changes to patent definitional and interpretational rules in a way that will tend to 
increase the systemic certainty of patent scope. 
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1.  Set Theory Overview 
Set theory provides a convenient structure for modeling legal 
uncertainty and patent scope.  Set theory is the branch of mathematics 
concerned with "sets," which are collections of distinct "objects" or 
"elements."146  An "element" of a set is the word used to indicate anything 
that is a member of or belongs to a particular set.147  To use a simple 
example, imagine a fruit bowl on one’s dining room table that contains one 
apple, one orange, and one banana.  The relevant set is "the set of fruit in 
the bowl on one’s dining room table" and the set members (or elements or 
objects) are "the apple, the orange, and the banana" that are in the bowl.  
The essential idea underlying the theory is that one can refer to entire 
collections of individual objects by referencing a single entity—the set.148 
Neither sets, nor set elements, need refer to physical, real-world 
objects.  A set can represent collections of abstractions or intangible 
concepts or ideas.149  Although a set can represent a collection of particular 
physical objects (the set containing one apple, one orange, and one banana 
in a fruit bowl on one’s dining room table), or general collections of 
physical objects (the set of all fruit; the set of all red fruit), it can also 
represent collections of abstractions (the set of all real numbers).  A set is 
just a convenient, mathematically formal way of representing distinct 
collections of objects.  "Set elements" (henceforth just "elements") should 
not be confused with the same terminology used in patent law to refer to the 
subparts of a patent claim—"patent-claim elements."150 
Because a set can contain abstractions, a particular set might represent 
a collection of numbers (e.g., the set containing the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
                                                                                                                 
 146. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 2.  I shall here be working with a basic version of set 
theory.  There are several variants of set theory, but the complexities and nuances are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Set theory was originally developed by the German 
mathematician George Cantor in the nineteenth century.  ROBER ROTH STOLL, SET THEORY 
AND LOGIC 1 (1979). 
 147. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 2. 
 148. STOLL, supra note 146, at 2. 
 149. Id. at 3. 
 150. It is unfortunate and perhaps confusing terminology that both set theory and patent 
law claims use the same term "element."  In patent law, a patent claim element is usually 
used as a synonym with a patent claim "limitation."  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (9th ed. 
2009).  By contrast, in set theory, an element is an abstract concept used to refer to any 
member of a set.  CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 115. 
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5) or a collection of phrases (e.g., the set containing the two phrases "Four 
score and seven years ago" and "We hold these truths to be self-evident"). 
We can also conceive of abstract sets relating specifically to law.  There can 
be a set of different legal arguments (e.g., the set containing "there is a 
cause of action in negligence under these facts" and "there is a cause of 
action in breach of contract under these facts") or a set of objects that are 
regulated by a given law.  For example, we can have a set of all the objects 
covered and regulated by a vehicular speeding statute.  "Automobiles" will 
be a member of that set whereas "dogs" will not be.  It is the latter two 
abstract sets—the sets containing plausible legal arguments and objects 
governed by laws—upon which I will shortly build my thesis.  Before I use 
set theory to model patent scope and legal uncertainty, let me first briefly 
justify its use in characterizing legal concepts. 
2.  Justifying the Use of Set Theory to Characterize Legal Concepts 
There are several reasons why set theory is a useful analytical tool for 
revealing insights about law.  For one, set theory has a fundamentally 
dichotomous framework, and this corresponds nicely to our general 
conceptions about legal scope and notice.  To understand why, we must 
first probe more deeply into the framework of set theory. 
The fundamental "concept of set theory is the membership relation."151  
Roughly speaking, the membership relation requires that for every object 
and every set, it has to be the case that the object either is a member of the 
set, or it is not a member of the set.152  In other words, there is no "in 
between" with respect to set membership.  This dichotomous requirement is 
known as the principle of bivalence or is sometimes discussed through a 
related principle—the law of the excluded middle.153  Under the principle of 
bivalence, whether a given object is a member of a set is either 
unambiguously true or unambiguously false.  
Bivalence provides us with a conceptual tool for dividing up the world.  
Given a particular set, we can cleanly separate and conceptualize "the 
                                                                                                                 
 151. CAUSEY, supra note 144, at 115. 
 152. See id. at 116–17 (discussing predicates and explaining that a given predicate must 
be true or false and that a certain object is, or is not, a member of the set). 
 153. See JENNIFER FISHER, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC 56–57, 91 (2007) (stating the 
law of the excluded middle means that every sentence, or its negation, is true, and the 
principle of bivalence means that every sentence must be either true or false). 
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world" as consisting of two groups:  The group of "objects" in the world 
that are members of the set we are considering, and the rest of the group of 
objects that are not (e.g., everything else in the world that is not part of the 
set).  The usefulness of the ability to conceptualize the world as sharply 
divided into two groups along some set of criteria will become apparent 
shortly as I apply it to characterize the scope of laws. 
3. Legal Bivalence and Legal Scope 
Legal scope has this same quality of bivalence, and it is this bivalent 
character that makes set theory a useful tool in its analysis of patent scope 
problems.  To understand this, it is helpful to recall our earlier 
characterization of legal scope as concerning an ex ante limit or boundary 
in the coverage of a given law.  A typical structure for a law’s boundary is a 
generic characterization of a class of actors and behaviors to be regulated, 
along with some criteria for distinguishing regulated from unregulated 
behavior and the consequences once those criteria are implicated.154  As a 
simple example, let us use a speed limit statute that makes it a violation of 
the vehicular code to travel in a motor vehicle on a highway at a speed 
greater than sixty-five miles per hour.155  This law lays out a generic 
description of objects (vehicles), actors (drivers), and particular future 
behaviors (traveling at a speed greater than sixty-five miles per hour).   
Superficially, ex ante legal uncertainty appears to be in tension with 
the principle of legal bivalence.  If applied to law, the principle of bivalence 
would seem to suggest that for any given factual situation, it would be 
either unambiguously true or unambiguously false whether that situation 
violates the law ex ante.  This seems at odds with common experience.  
After all, even seemingly unambiguous legal "rules"—such as the speed 
limit—can generate exceptions and genuine legal uncertainty ex ante.156  
                                                                                                                 
 154. This characterization is true whether the law is an explicit statute or the holding of 
a case.  In the latter, the holding is often an implicit "rule," the content of which is capable of 
being characterized at multiple levels of abstraction and generality.  Because an implicit 
holding can be plausibly characterized in different ways, there may not be unitary agreement 
about the "rule" of a case. 
 155. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 22349 (2009) ("Except as provided in Section 22356, 
no person may drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour."). 
 156. One common example might include a husband driver speeding to be by his wife’s 
side during birth.  There might be genuine uncertainty whether this fact pattern will be held 
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Moreover, many legal doctrines employ considerably less predictable legal 
"standards"—for example the "compelling government interest" standard in 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, I argue that it is not the 
objective legal reality, but the mechanism for resolving legal uncertainty, 
that creates the dichotomous, bivalent structure to which I refer. 
The law is bivalent ex post because legal officials ultimately have the 
institutional capacity to resolve any legal uncertainty.  Law is ultimately a 
societal construct and as such can be rendered dichotomous in a legally 
certain way ex post.  A particular set of facts either does or does not violate 
a particular law—as determined by a legal official.  An authoritative legal 
official can render a final, binding pronouncement that renders previously 
legally uncertain issues legally certain.  This is true even in fundamentally 
ex post policy-oriented areas such as First Amendment law, which involve 
deliberately flexible legal criteria.  Even with a complex and highly 
uncertain set of facts, a court has the authority to conclusively157 decide 
whether a fact pattern does, or does not, violate the First Amendment—in a 
bivalent manner.158  It is useful to recognize this connection explicitly, 
because it will be the divergence in ex ante and ex post bivalence in patent 
scope that will form the approach for characterizing scope uncertainty. 
B.  Formally Defining and Patent Scope 
1.  Formally Defining Patent Scope and Certainty 
Issues of patent scope are similarly concerned with legal bivalence.  
Our earlier assumption states that every law implicitly divides up the world 
into two groups:  Group 1 includes the future behaviors that are the subject 
of the law.  Group 2 includes the future behaviors that are not.  The 
principle of legal bivalence implies that (despite ex ante uncertainty) a legal 
official ultimately has the capacity to classify a given example of real world 
behavior into one of two categories:  Either the behavior "violated a given 
law" or "did not violate a given law."  This notion helps us to more formally 
                                                                                                                 
to violate the law. 
 157. Of course, there are different levels of hierarchy in law.  In some cases, the 
"conclusive" determinations of lower courts can be overruled by higher courts.  Nonetheless, 
there is always a court "of last resort" that can conclusively resolve a legal uncertainty. 
 158. Legal officials, in principle, have the ability to officially resolve legal uncertainty 
in this dichotomous and bivalent way through their final, binding authoritative judgments. 
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define the concept of legal scope using set theory.  We can functionally 
define the legal scope of a law in terms of two sets:  the set of actors, 
objects, behaviors, and states that violate the law and the set of those that do 
not.159 
We can characterize the scope of a patent claim in precisely this same 
way.  Patents are legal rights, and like a statute, a patent claim’s coverage is 
specified through the use of generalization to capture a class of expected 
real-world exemplars.  In the case of a product patent, the applicant aims to 
abstractly delineate coverage over some group of future devices that fall 
under the patent claims.160  We can think of the potential domain of the 
claim as all real-world objects and devices.  The essential question of literal 
patent scope is which real-world objects and behaviors are unambiguously 
covered by a patent claim, and which are not.  In a world of maximal 
precision—a perfectly scoped patent claim—the scope of a patent claim would 
delineate the hypothetical set of all real-world objects that unambiguously 
infringe the patent claim.  Every other device would form the set of objects 
outside the scope of the patent claim. 
Defining the scope of a patent claim through set theory is helpful because 
it directs our attention squarely on the scope membership criteria.  We must 
focus on the available criteria for separating objects into the set of objects 
covered by the claim from the set that is not covered by the claim. This in turn 
focuses on how effectively existing constraints on claim scope effectuate 
bivalence relative to the types of objects, devices, or technology the criteria will 
classify as infringing.  Specifically, if we are to improve the precision of patent 
scope, there must be sufficient, objective criteria framed at the level of detail 
necessary to classify the set of relevant objects.  If we do not have criteria 
specified at that level, then the ex ante scope or coverage of the patent will be 
uncertain.  In other words, the criteria will provide neither lay interpreters nor 
legal officials with unambiguous guidance for classifying as covered or not 
covered, a large set of real-world objects.  The first benefit of the set theory 
model is highlighting bivalence as a theoretical goal in terms of scope certainty. 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Set A = {Set of all entities and their future behaviors that violate the law}; Set B = 
{Set of all entities and their future behaviors that do not violate the law}. 
 160. In the case of a process patent, the coverage is toward all future behaviors that 
might fall under the purview of the process. 
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2.  Patent Scope Uncertainty Using Set Theory 
For similar reasons, set theory serves as a useful framework for modeling 
patent uncertainty due to scope underdetermination.  I will briefly summarize 
that argument.  Patent scope underdetermination often arises due to ex ante 
interpretive variability in claim terms.  Variability means that, in interpreting a 
patent, the claim words are capable of multiple, plausible interpretations or 
scope coverage, ex ante.  Such variability is often present even after applying 
the interpretive rules of claim construction in light of scope-limiting 
information available in the patent document.  Such variability can lead to 
uncertainty about claim scope and boundaries.  There is uncertainty because, in 
an infringement proceeding, a judge might elect any one of the interpretations 
plausible in light of constraints.  An objective lay interpreter will be unable to 
determine scope boundaries ex ante because they will be unable to know which 
of the possible interpretations will be authoritatively chosen by a legal-official 
ex post.  If there are many such plausible interpretive scopes available, there 
will be considerable legal uncertainty about the scope of a given claim. 
We can represent literal scope underdetermination within the descriptive 
syntax of set theory.  Uncertainty due to underdetermination is represented by 
the set of plausible interpretations for a patent claim word (or element).161  If 
the set of interpretations that can plausibly be advanced around a claim term is 
greater than one, there may be some legal uncertainty surrounding the meaning 
that the claim term can take on during litigation.  If the set of plausible 
meanings includes one interpretation which, if applied, will mean that an 
accused product will be found to infringe, and another which, if applied, will 
absolve a defendant of liability, then there is scope uncertainty for that claim 
relative to that product.  The set of plausible interpretations is one measure of 
scope uncertainty. 
Set theory also provides us with a functional model of claim scope 
uncertainty.  Recall that an ideal, perfectly scoped patent claim would 
objectively classify, with legal certainty, the set of all products into two subsets:  
(1) those products that literally infringe the patent and (2) those that do not.  For 
most claims, the interpretive information does not permit such unambiguous 
classification.  Rather there will be a third subset—those products for which it 
is legally uncertain whether they do or do not literally infringe.  One can 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Within law generally, "legal uncertainty" can be characterized by the set of 
plausible legal arguments surrounding an issue of law or fact. 
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approximate relative imprecision of patent scope by the size of this third set of 
underdetermined objects. 
This third set of underdetermined objects is crucially important.  First, this 
underdetermined set is clearly going to be the set of objects that will most 
likely be the subject of litigation.  Second, it provides a target for refining the 
scope of any claim:  Given the likely pool of products in which a patent will 
apply, has the patentee given enough definitional information such that we 
could unambiguously distinguish an object that is covered by the patent claim 
from an object that is not?  If the answer is no, then we likely need more 
information from the patent applicant.  Reducing scope uncertainty will be 
tantamount to reducing the size of this third set. 
C.  Formalizing Scope Restrictions 
1.  Constraint Satisfaction and Boundary Delimitation 
Because issues of patent scope are concerned with claim boundaries, it is 
important to also formalize the concept of scope limitation.  In this regard, I 
employ a framework from computer science known as "constraint 
satisfaction."162  This framework will model the process by which the scope of 
a patent term becomes successively more restricted through the interpretive 
process.  To reemphasize, in such a model, constraint satisfaction serves mostly 
as an analogy to help us approach uncertainty issues.  Having such a formal 
conceptual model will aid in understanding why some patent interpretive rules 
will tend to improve legal certainty and some will not. 
Constraint satisfaction is a mathematical construct used for modeling 
certain types of problems encountered in the computer science domain.163  
From an intuitive standpoint, constraint satisfaction can be thought of as 
formalizing the idea of "filtering" or successively narrowing possibilities 
                                                                                                                 
 162. A formal mathematical treatment of the framework is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  For completeness purposes, however, I provide a formal definition.  Formally, a 
constraint satisfaction problem is composed of three components: a set of variables, X; a set 
of domains, D; and a set of constraints, C.  A variable is a symbol that can take on one or 
more values.  The set of domains D describes the "domain," or the set of unconstrained 
possible values for each variable X.  Finally, the constraints C represent the constrained 
subset of possible values that a variable X can take on.  See STUART RUSSELL & PETER 
NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:  A MODERN APPROACH 202–04 (3d ed. 2010). 
 163. Id. at 202. 
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from a larger set of possibilities.164  Constraint satisfaction is built upon set 
theory.  A "constraint" as the name suggests, is simply a rule that narrows 
the valid members of a set.165  It can be thought of as a filtering rule that 
eliminates those members of the set that do not satisfy the substantive 
content of the constraint.  Thus, if we start with the set containing the 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and we apply the constraint rule "odd numbers 
are not permitted," we are left with the subset of numbers 2 and 4.  The 
members 1, 3, and 5 have been "filtered out" of the constrained set because 
they do not meet its criteria. 
Importantly, constraints can be additive.  Multiple constraints can 
apply and work in conjunction to further narrow a given set.  If we add the 
constraint "numbers over 3 are not permitted" to the existing constraint 
"odd numbers are not permitted," and apply both constraints to the set 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5, we are left with a subset containing a single member—the 
number 2.  Or, if we start with the set of two apples, two oranges, and two 
bananas in a particular fruit bowl, and apply the constraint "only yellow 
fruit are permitted," we are left with a subset containing only the bananas.  
Similarly, we can conceive of a set of plausible legal arguments that are 
present in a particular legal context and constraints as external authoritative 
filters that eliminate previously plausible arguments. 
The constraint satisfaction framework is thus about determining which 
possibilities are left in the "constrained set" after applying a series of 
constraining rules that tend to narrow and eliminate various possibilities.  
Generically, we can call the original, non-narrowed set the "search space."  
We can term the set that has been narrowed, after the constraints have 
filtered the search space, the "solution space."  Thus, in the above example, 
the "search space" consists of the set of "two apples, two oranges, and two 
bananas."  And the narrowed "solution space," applying the constraint "only 
yellow fruit are permitted," is the subset containing "two bananas." 
2.  Origins of Constraint Satisfaction as a Framework 
To understand the relevance of constraint satisfaction in the patent 
scope context, it is helpful to understand its origins.  Constraint satisfaction 
emerged in computer science as a technique for mathematically modeling 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Id. at 202–04. 
 165. Id. at 202. 
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certain real-world problems involving very large combinations of 
possibilities that might solve a particular problem.166  In theory, a computer 
might methodically assess every possibility to find one or more solutions to 
such a problem.  However, some mathematical problems have so many 
potential solutions that the number attempted would be staggeringly large.  
For example, one famous chess problem has over 100 trillion possible 
combinations, with only a very few of those combinations as actual 
solutions.167  Working methodically through 100 trillion combinations and 
analyzing each one as a potential solution is infeasible even for a modern 
computer.168 
The constraint satisfaction technique was developed to dramatically 
restrict the number of possible combinations a computer would have to 
analyze by filtering or constraining the possibilities ahead of time.  The set 
of every possible combination was known as the "search space," and the 
"solution set" was the small subset of the search space which was a solution 
to the problem.169  Constraint satisfaction allowed one to dramatically 
decrease the search space by applying multiple constraints or "filtering 
rules" that eliminated vast swathes of solutions in the search space.170  
Accordingly, if the size of the set of remaining solutions was radically 
reduced, the remaining set of potential solutions could actually be feasibly 
tested one by one by a computer.171  This framework thus allows the 
modeling of sets and using rules to filter out possibilities from that set. 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. at 202–04. 
 167. See id. at 71–72 (demonstrating that there are 1.8 x 1014 possibilities in the 
famous 8 Queens Problem). 
 168. If a computer, even today’s fastest one, was to methodically start at the beginning 
and try every combination to see if it worked, it would not be computationally possible to 
find a working solution in a reasonable amount of time.  Id. at 72. 
 169. Id. at 202. 
 170. Id. 
 171. For example, by applying a series of constraint rules which eliminate vast swathes 
of potential solutions from contention, computer scientists were able to reduce the number of 
possible solutions to be tested from 100 trillion to about 2,000—well within the abilities of 
modern computers.  See id. at 72 (reducing 1.8 x 1014 possibilities to 2,057). 
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 3.  Constraints on Meaning in Patent Law 
As an analogy, the constraint satisfaction framework is helpful for 
modeling the reduction of claim scope through interpretation.  As indicated, 
one way of abstractly conceiving of the interpretation of words in a patent 
claim is as a selection process among the multiple plausible interpretations, 
meaning, and scope that a word could have.  We can think of all of the 
potential distinct scopes as consisting of the "search space" of potential 
interpretations for the word.  A claim word has a set of possible scopes on 
its face—its unconstrained scope.  The plausible coverage is successively 
narrowed when we apply the interpretive rules that additively restrict its 
possible meanings.  For example, interpretation according to ordinary 
meaning to one skilled in the art might narrow the interpretive scope of a 
word further compared to its colloquial, every day usage. 
Ex ante, the plausible interpretive scopes of a patent claim word will 
be those that are left after such scope constraints have "filtered out" the 
other possibilities.  Thus, to use a simple example, if we have the claim 
word "encryption," the unconstrained scope might be a set of two 
meanings: "a cipher whether computerized or not" or narrowly as 
"computerized encoding."  We could imagine a scope restriction in the 
specification requiring encryption to be restricted to a computer context, 
considerably narrowing the scope to the second interpretation. 
Scope uncertainty due to underdetermination may occur when the 
constrained set of plausible interpretations permits multiple scopes.  
Roughly speaking, the more constrained the set of possibilities is, the fewer 
members there will be in the set of possible interpretations.  Conversely, the 
larger the set of plausible interpretations—the less constrained the set of 
possible interpretations there are—the larger the room for argument about 
the scope and interpretations, and consequently, the more legal uncertainty 
there will be.  Thus, the ability of constraints on meaning to narrow ex ante 
the search space is directly linked to the function of improving public notice 
and certainty of patent scope coverage. 
a.  Constraints on Meaning in Interpreting Patent Claims 
This constraint satisfaction conceptualization is helpful as a rough 
metric for evaluating patent rules to the extent that such rules promote the 
policy of certainty in the scope of coverage of patents.  To the extent that 
we have increased relative certainty about the boundaries, we will have 
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increased certainty as to coverage.  Lack of certainty about scope and 
boundaries will result in the lack of public notice as to the coverage of 
patents.172  To make the thesis more tangible, it is helpful to think about 
what acts as a constraint on claim meaning in the existing patent system.  
For the moment, let me just list the most obvious category constraints on 
claim meaning before evaluating them normatively in terms of their 
effectiveness. 
Drawing from the caselaw and statute, the major constraints on the 
meaning of a claim term, from the point of view of an interpreting judge 
are:   
• the patentee’s own included definitions for claim terms,173  
• the "ordinary and customary" meaning of claim terms as 
understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA) at the time of the invention,174  
• the context of and use of words in the same or surrounding 
claims,175 
• the contextual use of claim terms in the specification,176 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Note that I am not arguing for interpretive rules that result in the general 
narrowing of the scope of patent claim terms.  The distinction between appropriate scope 
and clear boundaries is one that is occasionally confused, and it is worth distinguishing.  
Rather, I am arguing for procedures which result in more ex ante legal certainty about the 
scope and boundaries of legal terms, and hence increase public notice.  It is entirely 
possible—and consistent with the thesis of this paper—to have valid patent terms of very 
broad scope, but whose scope and boundaries are simply well defined and delineated.  See 
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 46 (advancing the theory that due to a lack of clear 
notice "innovators find it increasingly difficult to determine whether a technology will 
infringe upon anyone’s patents"). 
 173. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
("Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, a 
patentee may . . . use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the 
special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history." 
(citations omitted)). 
 174. See Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 175. See id. ("‘[W]e must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written 
description and the prosecution history.’" (quoting Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp. 401 
F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). 
 176. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 ("[I]t is always necessary to review the specification 
to determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their 
ordinary meaning.  The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms 
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication." (citations omitted)). 
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• the use of claim terms or explicit disclaimers about meaning 
found in the prosecution history,177 
• the meaning of the term found in contemporary technical 
dictionaries,178 
• the meaning of claim terms as provided by experts who 
testify at trial,179 and finally,  
• the canons of construction.180 
Less obvious, but in the background, are more subtle constraints on 
claim meaning, including the ordinary meaning of words as construed by 
society generally in ordinary English.  Such constraints make it implausible 
to interpret words completely subjectively (absent a patentee-supplied 
definition) as meaning something fully outside their normal range of 
meaning.181  Also, there are legal technical meanings of words, such as 
transitions like "comprising of," defined by caselaw and convention. 
D.  Patent Scope Uncertainty and Marginal Analysis 
Before analyzing the effectiveness of these constraints, it is helpful to 
formally model the reduction of claim scope uncertainty.  The set-theoretic 
model is useful because it highlights a patent scope uncertainty-reduction 
strategy based upon marginal analysis of constraint information.  By 
"marginal analysis" I refer to the general process of inquiry that is focused 
upon changes in terms of increments—a procedure frequently associated 
with microeconomics.182 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See id. at 1583 ("‘The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms 
so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.’" (citations 
omitted)). 
 178. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 ("We have especially noted the help that technical 
dictionaries may provide to a court ‘to better understand the underlying technology’ and the 
way in which one of skill in the art might use the claim terms." (citations omitted)). 
 179. See id. ("We have also held that extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony 
can be useful to a court . . . to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has 
a particular meaning in the pertinent field." (citations omitted)). 
 180. See All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 780 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that patents can be interpreted "according to the familiar canons of 
claim construction" which includes "the claim language itself, . . . patent specification and 
prosecution history" (citations omitted)). 
 181. I argue that "plausibility" acts as a general constraint filtering out arguable but 
wildly unlikely potential definitions. 
 182. See, e.g., PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, THE COMMON SENSE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 40 
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Let me briefly summarize the marginal approach generally before 
applying it to the set-theoretical model of patent scope uncertainty.  
Marginal reasoning is associated with three general features:  (1) the ability 
to identify one or more referent or "baseline" levels upon which to initiate 
analysis, (2) the capability of identifying incremental increases or decreases 
relative to the selected reference point, and (3) a focus on the margin—
emphasizing the effects as a result of incremental changes.183 
For those unfamiliar with marginal reasoning, an example will help 
illustrate its usage.  This marginal approach is both best illustrated by, and 
most associated with economics.  In microeconomics, elementary problems 
often focus on the level of output of factories.  In such questions, the 
"marginal approach" to cost of production refers to a certain baseline level 
of production by a factory and explores the incremental cost of one 
additional unit over the selected baseline level of production.184  For our 
purposes, it is enough to note the marginal approach to cost is focused on 
the effects of an incremental unit or additional unit over the baseline.185 
The set-theoretic model helps us similarly analyze the problems of 
scope uncertainty at the margin.  What would it mean to take a marginal 
approach to legal uncertainty?  Similar to the economic conception, we 
would first need a means of characterizing a "baseline" or referent level of 
legal uncertainty.  Then we would need to focus our analysis upon 
incremental changes in terms of increased or decreased legal uncertainty 
from that baseline.  The marginal approach ultimately will enable an 
inquiry into incremental types of scope-defining information likely to 
increase the legal certainty of the scopes of patent claims. 
                                                                                                                 
(Lionel Robbins ed., 1933) ("Marginal considerations are considerations which concern a 
slight increase or diminution of the stock of anything which we possess or are 
considering."). 
 183. For a good introduction to marginal reasoning, see N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 6 (5th ed. 2009). 
 184. See id. ("Economists use the term marginal changes to describe small incremental 
adjustments to an existing plan of action."). 
 185. Another example of the marginal method comes from within economic analysis of 
negligence law.  A foundation of negligence is that one may sometimes employ precautions 
to reduce the risk of some activity (e.g., using snow tires to reduce risks of accidents while 
driving in the snow).  A marginal analysis of the benefits of adopting a precaution would not 
look at that precaution out of context.  Rather, the analysis would focus upon the incremental 
benefits conferred by the precaution over some existing level of precaution already being 
taken (e.g., a car that already employs four-wheel drive).  See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–68 (6th ed. 2002). 
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1.  Principle of Comparative Legal Uncertainty 
Recall that patent scope uncertainty is simply a special instance of 
legal uncertainty.  There is ex ante uncertainty, from the perspective of a 
lay observer, about the ex post outcome on the part of a legal official.  
Conceptualizing legal uncertainty using set theory provides some analytical 
advantages in terms of marginal reasoning.  If we think about legal 
uncertainty as consisting of sets or collections of potential legal outcomes 
then we are able to think more rigorously about the notion of comparing the 
amount of legal uncertainty between similar legal contexts on the basis of 
the set of plausible legal arguments under each context.  The contention that 
it is possible to compare the amount of legal uncertainty between two 
factual contexts is what I call the "principle of relative legal uncertainty."  I 
will explore this principle through a simple example from law generally and 
then apply it specifically to the patent scope context. 
Let us take a particular factual situation that is governed by particular 
legal rules, and call this a "factual context."  Imagine a factual scenario—a 
business transaction—in which either a tort rule or a contract rule may or 
may not apply.  Let us assume that one source of legal uncertainty 
surrounds the question of which of the two laws apply (and ultimately will 
be used to govern the outcome).  As an initial matter, there is going to be a 
body of potential legal arguments that are "self-evidentially" excluded from 
consideration.186  For example, unless there are specific reasons to believe 
otherwise, we can imagine that the typical business transaction does not 
involve the body of rules from the "law of space."  As Larry Solum has 
noted, in any given factual scenario, only a small subset of the total number 
of enacted laws and regulations can reasonably be said to apply.187 
In our example, the facts are such that it is simply uncertain, ex ante, 
whether the contract rule does or does not apply.  Definitively resolving the 
uncertainty as to the applicability of the law will ultimately fall to an 
authorized legal official.  To illustrate the point of comparative legal 
certainty, let us use the same factual scenario, but with one additional 
constraint.  In our modified scenario, we are adding the existence of an 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 470–73 (1987) (discussing what the author terms the "strong" 
indeterminacy thesis).  
 187. See id. at 471–72 (discussing and using examples where it is clear a given act does 
not break any legal rule to show the strong indeterminacy thesis cannot be true because it 
denies the possibility that such cases exist). 
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additional, explicit statute that clearly indicates that the contract rule does 
not apply under these facts.  Imagine further that there is no reasonable 
argument as to why this new statute does not settle the issue, and the legal 
official is not seeking to avoid this outcome.  It would be fair to say that the 
overall legal uncertainty in the second scenario is comparatively less than 
the first.  In the second, there is now only legal uncertainty concerning 
whether the tort rule applies and not uncertainty about whether both the tort 
rule and the contract rule apply. 
Let us consider this second modified scenario in terms of set theory.  
Holding everything else equal, there will be one fewer argument in the set 
of plausible legal arguments surrounding our modified factual situation.  
From the perspective of the legal official, there will be one fewer facially 
plausible option in terms of outcome.  The set of plausible legal arguments 
will no longer contain the following member:  "the contract rule might 
apply."  The principle of relative legal uncertainty thus contends that it is 
possible to compare the legal uncertainty between the former and the latter 
factual situations based upon the number of plausible legal arguments in 
each set.  According to this principle, the latter factual context containing 
the additional rule is incrementally and marginally less legally uncertain 
than the former.  One legal argument, which had contributed to the overall 
legal uncertainty surrounding the factual context, has been eliminated by 
the additional constraint.  Intuitively, we can think of net "legal uncertainty" 
in a given context as marginally decreasing when there is a change in which 
a previously plausible legal argument has been eliminated.  Similarly, we 
can think of net legal uncertainty as marginally increased when a previously 
implausible legal argument has somehow been made plausible. 
2.  Marginal Reduction of Legal Uncertainty 
This marginal methodology maps well onto strategies for reducing 
claim scope uncertainty due to underdetermination.  Patent law already 
requires some baseline level of scope delineation through detailed rules 
requiring claim specificity and contextual information in the specification.  
What types of additional classes of scope-defining information are likely to 
result in reduction in scope uncertainty?  We have framed an 
underdetermined scope by the “set" of interpretations that are plausible for 
a patent claim word in light of existing constraints.  A patent scope is 
uncertain, relative to an accused product, if a third party cannot determine, 
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ex ante with legal certainty whether that product does or does not infringe 
given the range of plausible scopes.  Thus, to improve scope certainty, the 
goal should focus on additional constraints that are likely to narrow or filter 
the set of plausible interpretations ex ante to the needed level of precision. 
In other words, for any claim, there are already a series of constraints 
that are narrowing the plausible scope of the claim to some degree.  The 
underdetermination problem occurs because these constraints are not 
precise enough ex ante, to filter some subset of plausible interpretations 
from ex post consideration by a legal official.  Increased scope certainty 
will be achieved when an additional constraint filters, ex ante, particular ex 
post interpretive options from consideration.  As in our earlier example 
involving the claim word "encryption," the addition of an explicit, on-point, 
scope-limiting definition in the specification, restricting the word to 
encryption on computers, marginally improved the literal scope certainty of 
that term.  For the set of accused products involving encryption not 
involving computers (e.g., by hand), the certainty of scope has been 
incrementally improved.  With an explicit, on-point constraint literally 
restricting scope, it has become costly188 for a legal official, ex post, to elect 
an interpretive option that runs counter to this restriction.  By contrast, an 
ostensible constraint that does not marginally reduce the set of plausible 
interpretations with certainty will prove to be mostly an illusory constraint. 
 By reflecting on incremental improvements in uncertainty, the 
marginal model allows us to sidestep a point of contention in legal 
scholarship—skepticism about the existence of "legal determinacy" or 
absolute legal certainty concerning legal conclusions.189  It is possible to 
talk about setting the conditions for marginal progress that improves the 
likelihood of increased scope certainty, rather than absolute notions of 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Again, following the lead of Critical Legal Studies scholars such as Duncan 
Kennedy, it is not impossible for legal officials—judge or jury—in the patent context to 
avoid the legal consequences of on-point, explicit constraints.  See Kennedy, supra note 109, 
at 788 (discussing the potential for judges to adopt strategic attitudes and to try to make legal 
materials "mean something other than what they at first appear to mean").  Rather, we think 
that such on-point constraints make deviation more costly.  Overall, the prevalence of such 
on-point constraints should lead to a relative predictability.  Comparatively speaking, patent 
law interpretation might be considered a more "formal" context in which formal boundaries 
tend to be respected as compared to other, more explicitly discretionary areas. 
 189. See Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 2–5 (2011), available at http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=12&article=1 
(discussing historical development of the view of legal determinacy in American legal 
scholarship in the context of proposing ways of using computer automation in determining 
legal outcomes). 
EFFICIENT UNCERTAINTY IN PATENT INTERPRETATION 1801 
 
certainty or uncertainty. From a rule consequentialist perspective we can 
examine properties of patent procedures in light of their general propensity 
to marginally increase or decrease legal uncertainty in particular situations.   
3.  Metrics for Notice-Enhancing Constraints 
The set theory/constraint satisfaction model is thus useful because it 
allows us to identify general theoretical properties for constraints in terms 
of their ability to improve patent scope certainty.  On the basis of these 
properties, we can then evaluate specific patent interpretive procedures.  If 
improving public notice is about narrowing the search space of potential 
meanings ex post, there are three general theoretical properties that will be 
desirable in constraints:  (1) A constraint must be "set narrowing"; (2) the 
content of the constraint rule must be ex ante determinable; and (3) the 
interpretive information-defining criteria of the constraint must be 
sufficiently precise to classify the universe of accused products as 
infringing or not.  More generally, a patent claim will have improved scope 
certainty to the extent it is bivalent with respect to unambiguously 
classifying, ex ante, the set of potential accused products into two sets:  
those that literally infringe the claim and those that do not. 
The first desirable property in a constraint is ex ante determinability.  
If we consider a constraint as a classification-rule then ex ante 
determinability means that we are able to determine ahead of time the 
precise content of the rule itself.  If the content of a constraint is itself ex 
ante contestable, then the constraint cannot have a narrowing effect because 
we do not know which version of a filtering rule will ultimately be applied 
to narrow meaning.  This is the primary problem encountered earlier with 
implicit constraints inferred contextually from usage in the specification. 
In our set theory/constraint model we can now understand the problem 
of implicit constraints.  Claim scope certainty is improved when an ex ante 
constraint definitively removes from plausibility some possible 
interpretations for a claim word.  An implicit constraint is typically not able 
to perform such an ex ante filtering function.  This is because the content 
and scope of the constraint itself is open to contestation.  A lay interpreter 
cannot rely on such an implicit constraint to definitively narrow the set of 
possible scope interpretations because it is not clear that a legal official, ex 
post, will either adopt that same constraint or apply it at the same 
interpretive scope. 
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The multiple meanings pattern of underdetermination provides another 
example of an ineffective ex ante constraint.  Consider the use of a 
dictionary definition as a constraint to resolve the meaning of a claim term 
in litigation.  Suppose that there are five respected dictionaries, each with 
its own set of definitions.  For each dictionary, the included definition has 
multiple meanings for the word.  If we were to say that the meaning of a 
patent claim term should be resolved by reference to "external dictionaries," 
we will not meaningfully narrow the "solution space" of possible 
interpretations ex ante.  We do not know, as a threshold matter, which 
dictionary will be used and which numbered meaning within that dictionary 
will ultimately be selected.  Rather, the content of the constraint is 
probabilistic and is not ex ante determinable with certainty. 
Contrast an implicit constraint on meaning—the way the patentee uses 
a word in context in the patent document—with an explicit constraint—a 
formal, explicit, patentee-provided definition for a word.  The content of the 
latter explicit constraint is ex ante determinable as compared to the former. 
The content of an explicit definition included by a patentee in the four 
corners of the patent document has the possibility of being ex ante 
determinable.  At the very least, if the rules require the interpreter to use the 
patentee-supplied definition, we know, ex ante, the specific version of the 
interpretive rule that must be applied ex post. 
The fact that the patentee has supplied an explicit definition in the four 
corners of the document does not by itself guarantee precision in claim 
scope.  After all, patentees can always supply definitions that are vague or 
ambiguous on their face.  But as I will argue, such a scenario is preferable 
to the scenario without any explicit definitions.  If an explicit, unitary 
definition is vague or ambiguous, there is at least a possibility that the 
patent office can require specific additions to make it more clear and 
precise.  When a definition exists implicitly in a probabilistic range of 
possible background definitions—the set of plausible definitions according 
to a person of ordinary skill in the art—a patent examiner cannot know with 
precision the ultimate definition that will be employed, or may overlook 
such an implicit constraint altogether. 
In sum, the set theory constraint satisfaction model tells us to aim for a 
theoretical target of bivalence for claim scope:  a well-scoped claim will 
classify the set of relevant objects as literally infringing or not.  Constraints 
that are explicit and ex ante determinable in form tend to be superior to 
constraints whose content is probabilistic.  Moreover, the model gives us a 
target for improving scope certainty with a baseline patent claim:  Given a 
patent claim as currently scoped, what additional pieces of scope-defining 
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information are likely to exclude foreseeably relevant claim word 
interpretations, moving incrementally closer to bivalence? 
The set-theory/constraint model is clear:  Scope certainty is generally 
improved via explicit constraints that reduce the set of plausible interpretive 
scopes that patent claim elements can have.  For example, consider that a 
patent often includes implicit limitations that can be arguably inferred from 
the specification—particularly features that are common across all included 
embodiments.  Scope certainty can be improved by an explicit constraint 
that definitively indicates whether such a constraint should or should not 
apply.  As I will suggest in the next section, patent examiners can 
efficiently reduce scope uncertainty by requiring explicit articulation of 
such boundary lines—effectively turning ambiguous implicit constraints 
into explicit, determinable, set-narrowing constraints.  This will make the 
claim’s boundary more certain relative to the class of products that seek to 
invent around the claim.  The model also suggests an efficiency 
limitation—when the marginal benefit of additional interpretive 
information will not meaningfully narrow the set further.  The next Part will 
explore the policy and efficiency implications of the model. 
V.  Policy Changes 
A.  Implications of the Model on Patent Rules and Practices 
The model has important policy implications toward improving overall 
patent scope certainty.  The first section of this Part will explain why the 
model provides some limited justification for the Federal Circuit’s patent 
interpretive doctrine.  The second section includes suggested modifications 
to the patent system based upon the model.  These generally seek to 
improve claim scope certainty by requiring patentees to include clarifying 
information in the ex ante public record.  The target will be disclosures that 
disambiguate uncertainty in foreseeable190 scope uncertainty scenarios. 
                                                                                                                 
 190. There are common, repeated patterns in which patent scope is commonly 
contested.  For example, defendants often seek to impute limitations from the embodiments.  
Such ambiguity can be resolved ex ante by requiring scope clarifications by the patentee on 
the record. 
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1.  Theoretical Justification and Patent Interpretation Doctrine 
The Federal Circuit’s claim interpretation jurisprudence identifies 
different sources that act to constrain the scope of meaning of patent claim 
words (e.g., dictionary definitions, plain and ordinary meaning standard, 
specification).  This Part critically evaluates these different constraints in 
light of ex ante scope definition and this Article’s formal model. 
Recall that the boundaries of a patent claim are often uncertain ex ante 
when claim words are capable of multiple, plausible scope interpretations.  
A third party cannot easily know which scope will ultimately be chosen 
until it is determined by a judge or jury at litigation.  The model represented 
this scope uncertainty problem by the set of plausible interpretative scopes 
that any given patent claim word can have ex ante after applying the 
interpretive rules that restrict the potential meanings of the scopes of words. 
The model highlighted three general properties of constraints 
associated with increased scope certainty.  An interpretive constraint that 
provides ex ante notice as to boundaries should: (1) be ex ante determinable 
(e.g., explicit); (2) provide distinct criteria with enough precision such that 
a lay interpreter can exclude particular interpretive scopes; and (3) be 
bivalent—classify the relevant set of accused products as either infringing 
or not with some degree of legal certainty.  Constraints that exhibit these 
properties are more likely to restrict the set of plausible interpretive scopes, 
excluding relevant products from the literal scope ex ante and ex post. 
We can use these properties to normatively evaluate patent law’s 
various interpretive constraints.  The rules for interpreting claim words are 
largely established by the Federal Circuit’s claim construction 
(interpretation) doctrine.191  During the process of claim construction, a 
presiding judge often seeks objective guidance on the appropriate scope to 
give the contested words of the claim.192  According to doctrine, there are 
two main categories of sources upon which interpretive decisions are to be 
made—intrinsic (e.g., evidence internal to the patent document and 
prosecution history) and extrinsic (e.g., external sources such as 
dictionaries, expert testimony, and treaties).  In 2005, the Federal Circuit in 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Some portion of the claim terms (primarily non-technical terms) may go directly to 
the jury for infringement determination without first being construed by the judge.  In that 
instance, the jury implicitly decides what the scope of a claim term is in conducting the 
infringement analysis.  See Menell et al., supra note 80, at 731. 
 192. As indicated previously, claim construction is the process by which the presiding 
judge fixes the meaning of a claim term during the course of an infringement lawsuit. 
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Phillips v. AWH Corp.193 instructed district court judges to give "intrinsic" 
sources of evidence considerably more weight than "extrinsic" sources of 
evidence in making claim interpretations.194 
Did the Phillips court reach the desired outcome in terms of improving 
claim scope certainty?  This Article’s model suggests that the court’s 
approach is generally sound.  However, I will argue that the courts 
"intrinsic/extrinsic" classification, while useful, is undertheorized.  The 
important question is not whether various sources of interpretive constraints 
are classified as "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" in the court’s typology, but 
whether they are consistent with the theoretical properties of ex ante 
determinability, bivalence, and set-narrowing precision. 
To understand this distinction, consider the benefits of intrinsic 
evidence for scope purposes.  A primary characteristic distinguishing 
intrinsic from extrinsic evidence appears to be ex ante determinability.  The 
label "intrinsic" primarily refers to evidence from the "four corners" of the 
patent document and prosecution history.  Extrinsic evidence is 
characterized by contrast to intrinsic, consisting of "all evidence external to 
the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, 
dictionary, and learned treatises."195  An important feature of intrinsic 
evidence for scope defining purposes is that it is part of the ex ante 
publically accessible record.  To a lay interpreter attempting to discern 
boundaries, intrinsic evidence is relatively more determinable ex ante than 
extrinsic evidence.  The interpreter knows exactly where to look for 
intrinsic evidence and what its primary content will be.  By contrast, 
extrinsic evidence is largely undetermined until litigation.  Consider 
reliance upon expert testimony ex post to establish claim scope.  The 
specific testimony of particular expert witnesses cannot be known with 
precision until established during the course of an actual infringement suit, 
except at perhaps a very broad level. 
The court’s prioritization of intrinsic evidence—publically available 
information—is consistent with the model’s determinability property.  Ex 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–22 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(reestablishing the priority of intrinsic evidence over extrinsic evidence, and stating, 
"extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result in a reliable 
interpretation of patent claim scope"). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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ante claim scope boundaries are enhanced when a lay interpreter can know 
with certainty the form and substance of the restrictions on possible claim 
meanings that will later be employed ex post.  Intrinsic evidence is fixed to 
some degree in the written record.  The problem with extrinsic evidence 
generally is that it is not typically a static, but a probabilistic, proposition 
with a wide range of variance, until determined at litigation.  Because of 
this, lay interpreters attempting to discern literal scope boundaries typically 
have less legal certainty about those boundaries.  They will ultimately be 
determined by reference to such probabilistic, extrinsic evidence. 
This is further illustrated by a prototypical extrinsic source—a 
dictionary.  If a claim term is not defined, doctrine requires judges to 
construe it from the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the term to one of 
ordinary skill in the art.196  For courts seeking objective indicia of 
contemporaneous technical understandings of a term, one natural source is 
a technical dictionary.197  In a typical case, there are several such 
dictionaries that might plausibly be used.198  For each dictionary, the 
relevant entry may have multiple meanings or scopes for a given word.199  
If extrinsic dictionaries are used ex post to resolve the scope of a word, the 
scope-delimiting rule that will be employed during litigation cannot be 
firmly established ex ante.  A third party cannot know, for instance, which 
dictionary will be used, which definition in that dictionary will control, or 
what the ultimate scope the definition will be held to consist of will be.  
                                                                                                                 
 196. The patent document serves to establish the boundaries of the patent holder’s 
exclusive rights.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).  In interpreting patent claims, judges look to hone 
in on the meaning of the claim words by consulting evidence from multiple sources.  See 
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
court may utilize a number of sources).  These indicia of likely meaning come from within 
the patent document itself (intrinsic evidence) but also include evidence of meaning external 
to the patent document such as dictionaries (extrinsic evidence).  See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 
1582–83 (discussing the proper weighing of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence).  Judges 
typically use these indications to restrict possible meanings of claims to their most 
reasonable interpretation in light of various sources of evidence.  See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 
1582–83 (characterizing unambiguous language as highly relevant). 
 197. Other sources that might be used to refine that meaning include expert testimony, 
technical books, or contemporary scholarly or operational literature from the field. 
 198. See, e.g., L & P Property v. JTM, LLC, 578 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (D. Mass. 2008) 
("Defendants take issue with L & P’s definition of ‘encryption’ by citing numerous 
definitions from technical dictionaries."). 
 199. See Mullally, supra note 26, at 369 ("The unfettered discretion that judges had in 
choosing among a considerable number of dictionaries without explanation and then 
selecting a particular definition within a given entry gave rise to a highly uncertain 
environment for claim construction."). 
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Such an uncertain constraint will often not provide needed certainty to 
define ex ante boundaries.  For this reason, the default "plain and ordinary 
meaning" standard, resolved via extrinsic sources like dictionaries, often 
provides illusory scope restrictions.  It represents, not one, but a 
probabilistic set of possible constraints. 
By contrast, intrinsic evidence typically fares better than extrinsic 
evidence in terms of scope-defining properties (although it is by no means 
perfect).  This is illustrated by the paragon of scope-defining intrinsic 
evidence—the patentee—supplied definition.  Patent applicants are 
permitted (but not required) to explicitly define their patent claim terms in 
the specification.200  Such explicit definitions have the potential to 
maximize ex ante notice because they will meet at least two desired 
constraint properties. First, because a definition is embodied in a fixed, 
reified, textual form in the specification there are not threshold 
contestability issues about the primary content of the definitional rule to be 
applied.  Contestation is limited to refinements of meaning.  Second, if 
properly linked to a specific claim word, there will not be normalization 
problems.  Moreover, third parties can know if the definition, on its face, 
contains ambiguities, open-texture, or explicit discretion.  The Federal 
Circuit has also touted intrinsic evidence as more reliable because the 
patentee created it contextually at the time of drafting.201  This contextual 
benefit of intrinsic evidence can be seen in terms of increased ex ante 
determinability relative to typical extrinsic evidence.  There is a greater 
chance that the patentee deliberately intended to employ a constraint of 
which they were potentially in control during drafting, as compared to a 
constraint provided by a completely extrinsic source, of which the applicant 
may not actually have ever known about. 
2.  Federal Circuit’s Approach:  Both Over and Underinclusive 
The Federal Circuit’s approach, while mostly supported by the model, 
is both over and underinclusive.  There are examples of intrinsic evidence 
defining scope poorly and of extrinsic evidence providing adequate scope 
guidance.  For this reason, it is helpful to consider constraints in terms of 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See MPEP, supra note 5, § 2173.05(a). 
 201. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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underlying theoretical properties rather than in the Federal Circuit’s 
intrinsic/extrinsic typology, which fails to guide in several cases.  
Some extrinsic evidence sufficiently narrows the scope of possible 
meaning ex ante at the level of precision needed for infringement 
distinctions.  Examples come from research areas with technical words that 
are inherently well-bounded202 or which have well-defined, widely agreed-
upon meanings.  This is exemplified by certain aspects of the biological and 
chemical domains.  In some instances, references to molecule formations or 
other technical terms are sufficiently well-bounded in the art so as to make 
further, intrinsic, refinement unnecessary.  In that case, a lay interpreter can 
actually determine extrinsically defined boundaries ex ante.  Extrinsic 
references, such as technical treatises, may share common meanings.  Such 
examples of scope-defining extrinsic evidence can be ex ante determinable, 
precise, and bivalent. 
Similarly, simply because evidence is intrinsic does not mean that it 
will clarify scope boundaries ex ante.  Part III provided examples of 
implicit constraints that are often inferred from intrinsic evidence.  When 
intrinsic evidence is implicit, there are typically problems of ex ante 
determinability of scope, content, and applicability of the constraint similar 
to extrinsic evidence.  For example, defendants often infer constraints from 
the specification based upon limitations shared across embodiments.  Such 
implicit constraints are often ambiguous and contestable and tend not 
reduce scope uncertainty ex ante.  Similarly, even explicit definitions in the 
specification employ imprecise words leading to similar scope uncertainty 
issues.203  Moreover, intrinsic constraints may effectively turn into extrinsic 
constraints if a judge resorts to external sources (e.g., dictionaries) to 
further define them.  Certain intrinsic evidence is endowed with all of the 
extrinsic limitations just described.  This suggests that we should evaluate 
constraints specifically in terms of actual content, explicitness, and 
precision. 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 476 
(2004) ("[A]ttributes that are easy to recognize and define make it easier for observers to 
cognize the boundaries of the good."). 
 203. Scope disputes often concern words that are framed at an open-ended or high level 
of abstraction.  It is easy to imagine an explicit patentee-supplied definition in the 
specification that did not improve scope certainty simply because it employed imprecise 
criteria.  In this respect, the mere addition of a definition in the specification does not 
necessarily improve precision if the included definition is poorly or broadly defined. 
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The fact that considerable scope underdetermination is common may 
partially explain the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate in district court 
claim-construction decisions.204  In such underdetermined contexts there are 
simply multiple, plausible interpretive scopes available in light of the 
existing intrinsic and extrinsic constraints on meaning.  Thus a high reversal 
rate would be expected under de novo review.  A reversal may not indicate 
that a district court necessarily arrived at an objectively wrong (i.e., 
implausible) interpretation.  Rather, it may be that the Federal Circuit has 
simply elected a different but reasonable interpretive outcome given the 
latitude of options permitted by intrinsic and extrinsic constraints. 
B.  Changes to the Patent Drafting Process Suggested by the Model 
In this section, I suggest changes to the patent system indicated by the 
model.  They are largely centered on strategically increasing scope-defining 
information disclosed by patentees ex ante.  The model’s principle of 
bivalence provides a useful theoretical guide:  Does a patent record provide 
sufficient constraints on claim scope so that a lay interpreter could 
determine whether relevant products infringe or not?  If the answer is no, 
then there may be foreseeable boundary lines that a patent examiner can 
require a patentee to clarify during the application process.  I will analyze 
these suggestions in terms of efficiency, noting that they are compatible 
with ex post approaches to managing patent uncertainty.205 
1.  Patentees Should Be Required to Be Their Own Lexicographers 
One theoretically supported approach is to require patentees to include 
definitions in the specification for all claim words.  Currently, patent 
applicants have the option of including claim word definitions in their 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See, e.g., Kimberly Moore, Markman Eight Years Later:  Is Claim Construction 
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005) (finding a claim construction 
reversal rate of roughly 34.5% from 1996 to 2003); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes 
Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) (citing reversal rates of between 30% and 40% in various years 
from 1995 to 2005). 
 205. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7, at 18; Hubbard, supra note 10, at 327. 
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specification if they wish to act as "their own lexicographer."206  Since the 
patentee-supplied definition is the paragon of a scope-defining constraint, a 
rule requiring patentees to include definitions could increase overall scope 
certainty for issued patents.  Putting net efficiency concerns aside for the 
moment, consider why definitions are desirable in this regard. 
From a theory standpoint, a patentee-supplied definition has the 
potential to maximize scope notice.  Because such definitions are fixed in 
the public record, several points of contestability, and hence, ex post 
uncertainty, tend not to apply.  There will be less uncertainty ex post about 
whether the definition should be interpreted as a scope restriction and less 
uncertainty about the general substance of that constraint.  In short, such 
explicit definitions are ex ante determinable. 
Second, such definitions can potentially provide precise scope-
defining criteria.  The goal of a well-scoped constraint is to refine the 
contours of the claim boundaries to more precisely distinguish ex ante 
literal coverage.  According to the set-theoretic model, the approach is to 
provide incremental, additional explicit clarifications in the record that 
include or exclude particular scope interpretations (i.e., narrow the set of 
plausible interpretations).  In this way, these explicit, additional 
declarations interpreted together as a set of constraints that must be met 
more finely demarcate boundary lines.  This allows for more reliable ex 
ante distinctions relative to potentially infringing products. This principle is 
illustrated by the earlier example involving the claim term "board." A 
refined set of constraints might distinguish ex ante the types of boards the 
claim is meant to cover in terms of its component material.  Such an 
incremental clarifying definition might add that board covers "only wood."  
Precise claim scope contouring is achieved by adding successive 
"classification rules" that provide additional criteria likely to classify 
external products as literally infringing or not. 
One might imagine that patentees would routinely pick the broadest 
interpretation to ensure maximum future coverage.  But even a broadly 
scoped declaration of "all materials" is preferential to an ambiguously 
scoped claim because its broad scope is explicit on the public record.  At a 
minimum, third parties can know that the claim is broad on its face and can 
more easily identify prior art or enablement issues that limit its validity.  In 
                                                                                                                 
 206. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
("Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, a 
patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their 
ordinary meaning."). 
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principle, ex ante scope delineations could be more complex than the 
example, to more finely approach the actual boundary contours of the 
patentee’s invention.  A variation of this logic is already at work in patent 
law.  Patentees make explicit disavowals of claim scope on the public 
prosecution history record to avoid invalidating prior art.  Such explicit 
disavowals have the effect of demarcating scope boundaries ex ante (and ex 
post) with greater precision.207  Ex ante clarifying declarations make 
contrary ex post scope arguments vastly less plausible. 
The constraint satisfaction model also addresses problems of "infinite 
regress"—that arguments simply shift to "definitions defining 
definitions."208  A well-specified and properly interpreted patentee 
definition should not suffer from this issue, as all additional scope 
constraints should be applied additively.  This means if we have a patentee-
included definition, and we are using an external dictionary to further 
define it, the external definition should be interpreted with an "AND" to the 
existing definition.  All constraints must be interpreted together to 
successively narrow scope.  An additional constraint on meaning, should 
rarely209 serve to broaden the scope beyond that which is already specified.  
It should instead provide another classification rule for refining scope.  The 
problem of infinite regress (definitions of definitions) occurs when courts 
mistakenly interpret additional external definitions in isolation from 
existing constraints.  To the extent a new external definition contradicts or 
supplants existing constraints on meaning, it is improper.   
There are a few caveats to the suggestion for patentee-supplied 
definitions.  First, intrinsic definitions themselves do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
 207. During the patent application process, patent applicants have to contend with 
patent examiner rejections due to prior art which already covers the applied-for invention.  
Patentees will often amend claims to narrow the scope to avoid the prior art.  The doctrine of 
prosecution history estoppel is a limitation on infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.  There is a presumption that patentees cannot cover equivalents that would fall 
under the scope that they have previously surrendered during prosecution.  See Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–33 (2002) (addressing the 
issues stemming from the uncertainty of a patent claim’s extent); see also Holbrook supra 
note 143, at 13 ("The prosecution history will act as an estoppel in the literal infringement 
context just as it will in . . . infringement under the doctrine of equivalents."). 
 208. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS 
L.J. 6, 69–70 (2006) (suggesting that defining claims using additional words simply 
generates "meta" debates over the meaning of the words used to define). 
 209. Constraints that are disjunctive or contain an "or" may not be set-narrowing.  Thus, 
adding a constraint that says "X or Y" might expand the set of possible interpretations. 
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improve scope if not done correctly.  As suggested, even explicit definitions 
in a specification can be ambiguous on their face or provide inadequately 
precise criteria.  Scope definition likely has to be an interactive process, 
with patent examiners taking an active role in requiring clarifications 
regarding the scope of supplied definitions and with such clarifications 
appearing on the public record to aid ex ante interpretation.210  Second, 
scope uncertainty is legal uncertainty and is ultimately related to 
interpretive procedures ex post by judges in infringement proceedings or on 
appeal.  Thus, any improvement in clarifying formal boundary lines ex ante, 
must be accompanied by commitments by judges, ex post, to generally 
follow those boundary lines when the constraints are on point.  Notice 
requires a policy of ex post forbearance on the part of judges in crafting 
deviations or shifting uncertainty downstream to the equivalents analysis.  
Third, there could be exceptions for areas of inventions in which the terms 
are already extrinsically well-bounded and have a well-understood meaning 
with a low range of variability (e.g., pharmaceuticals).  Finally, there are 
efficiency concerns when increasing demands on patent applicants and 
examiners with more stringent requirements.  I will explore some of these 
concerns below and suggest some more limited approaches. 
2.  Efficiency and Increased Ex Ante Disclosure Requirements 
It is important to consider the net costs of any mitigating strategies 
requiring more ex ante information from patentees. When applying for a 
patent, it is difficult to predict the ultimate commercial value of the 
protected technology.  Some researchers estimate that only 5% of issued 
patents actually turn out to be valuable enough to be worth contesting after 
issuance.211  Rules that require increased application disclosures broadly 
create private costs that are borne by all patent applicants, whether or not 
the patents turn out to be economically viable.  From a society-wide 
perspective, it might be inefficient to require applicants to expend resources 
                                                                                                                 
 210. For a good approach to such active examination by patent examiners, see 
Petherbridge, supra note 14, at 174.  I will presently discuss how to strategically limit 
expenditure of examiner resources. 
 211. Lemley, supra note 60, at 1507 ("As we have seen, only about 1.5% of patents are 
litigated at all.  The total number of patents licensed for royalties without even a complaint 
being filed is likely somewhat higher, but I suspect the total number of patents litigated or 
licensed for a royalty (as opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued 
patents."). 
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refining the scope of all patents, when only 5% of those patents end up 
being consequential.  The resources expended refining the remaining 95% 
appear to be a social loss and would not be efficient if that cost outweighs 
the scope improvement benefits gained for the 5% of consequential patents.  
If patent rules require too much additional ex ante information, the net costs 
may outweigh the net benefits from a society-wide perspective.   
Because of the small percentage of patents ultimately of value, some 
scholars have advocated ex post solutions focused on active, judicial 
filtering at litigation.  William Hubbard and others have argued that it only 
makes sense to increase the costs of improving patent certainty if the 
marginal costs of such ex ante investments are outweighed by the net social 
benefits.212  I agree with this position.  However, as Part II suggests, current 
cost-benefit analysis is likely underestimating the external costs imposed by 
even the 95% of patents that remain unused on third-party firms and also on 
end-users.  Firms cannot know which patents will be asserted and, to some 
degree, must internalize the risk of all patents and not just the 5% that 
ultimately are asserted in some way.  Similarly, a much larger percentage of 
patents are the subject of threatened litigation, which can have a similar 
cost-inducing effect.213  Thus, the net external costs of uncertainly scoped 
patents are likely to be somewhat larger than the percent that are worth 
asserting, in the cost-benefit analysis. 
However, Hubbard’s marginal benefit/cost approach is ultimately 
correct.  There is some efficient balance between requiring enough 
information from patentees to provide reasonable scope notice, and not so 
much information ex ante so as to broadly waste resources that could be put 
to more productive uses.  Existing patent requirements already cause 
applicants to incur considerable costs.  Application rules currently require a 
considerable level of detailed information on an application (e.g., 
specification, claims, statutory requirements).  Providing such information 
is often difficult and costly for a patentee.  In the spectrum of "too much ex 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See Hubbard, supra note 10, at 359–60 ("[D]rafting more explicit patents and 
patent claims requires additional investment by patentees and may require additional work 
on the part of patent examiners as well.  These additional costs will not be efficient unless 
they are outweighed by the benefits they produce."). 
 213. It is a very low-cost strategy for a patent holder to mail threatening "cease and 
desist" letters and to demand relatively low licensing fees.  Simply receiving such a letter is 
enough to cause most firms to expend resources analyzing and perhaps internalizing the 
expected risk of infringement. 
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ante information" and "not enough ex ante information," it is difficult to 
know where the current balance lies relative to some theoretical optimum.  
However, the evidence in this Article suggests that we can recalibrate the 
rules incrementally towards the ex ante end of the spectrum to achieve net 
benefits in improving overall claim–scope, given its external costs. 
Rules that create more certain claim scope boundary lines also have 
costs in terms of patent value.  As suggested in Part II, there is some public 
benefit to patent scope uncertainty because it allows judges, ex post, to 
flexibly adapt claim construction scope to reflect the patentee’s inventive 
contribution.  An interpreting judge can give an uncertain claim a wide 
scope if he believes that coverage is merited given the accused product and 
inventive contribution.  Similarly, a judge can elect a narrower interpretive 
scope to ensure that an accused product falls outside of the literal range.  If 
patent scope boundaries are "too" rigid ex ante and ex post interpretations 
are "too" constrained, the scope of meritorious patent claims may not 
adequately cover unpredictable after-arising technologies or avoid claim 
boundaries through insubstantial changes.  If rigid ex ante patent 
requirements create the perception among inventors that the patent system 
leads to inadequate coverage and value for their claims, inventors may not 
be incentivized to develop inventions in the first instance.214 
There is an inherent tension between ex ante notice of boundary lines 
and ex post flexibility in claim coverage that is common throughout law.215  
On the spectrum of ex ante formality and ex post discretion, this Article 
suggests a moderate recalibration toward the ex ante spectrum.  Patent law 
has a policy that the infringement coverage of a patent claim should be 
proportional to the patentee’s inventive contribution.216  Formal and precise 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396–97 (1967) 
The inability of words to achieve precision is none the less extant with patent 
claims than it is with statutes.  The problem is likely more acute with claims.  
Statutes by definition are the reduction of ideas to print.  Since the ability to 
verbalize is crucial in statutory enactment, legislators develop a facility with 
words not equally developed in inventors.  An invention exists most importantly 
as a tangible structure or a series of drawings.  This conversion of machine to 
words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. 
 215. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (offering "an economic analysis of the extent to which legal 
commands should be promulgated as rules or standards"). 
 216. Indeed this policy is represented by the enablement requirement from 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112.  See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("[Section 112] requires 
that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement 
provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art."). 
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patent boundary requirements risk that a patent holder’s coverage will be 
underinclusive relative to its inventive contribution. However, existing 
patent drafting rules already have a significant amount of formality, and 
already tolerate the risk of underinclusion.  Patent applicants are required to 
specify their patent claims with a significant level of precision, dividing 
them into descriptive elements.  There are most surely cases where this 
formality requirement results in ex post underinclusion. 
Again, it is difficult to know where current patent drafting rules are on 
the optimal ex ante, ex post spectrum relative to underinclusion of 
coverage.  As indicated, a possibly beneficial artifact of an uncertainly 
scoped claim is that it permits courts ex post flexibility to correct for 
underinclusion and undercompensation.  However, a more straightforward 
approach would work better.  Significant cases of underinclusion are likely 
rarer compared to marginal scope disputes.  In the presumably rare cases of 
significant undercompensation due to rigid claim boundary lines, judges 
should aggressively employ the doctrine of equivalents.217  This has the 
benefit of achieving the same effect more transparently without the negative 
externalities of scope uncertainty applying in the larger remainder of the 
patent pool in which underinclusion is not a problem.  In the (comparatively 
small) instances of ex ante delineation that are unavoidable—as described 
in Part III—judges should be responsive ex post.218 
Patent applicants are also likely to be the least cost avoiders for such 
scope coverage and uncertainty issues.219  Placing a greater ex ante scope-
defining burden on applicants may properly align incentives to reduce net 
uncertainty costs.  Defining patent boundaries precisely ex ante is often 
costly, difficult, and prone to error.220  In one view, the boundary-defining 
problem can be reframed in terms of risk:  Who bears the ex ante risk of 
over or underinclusion of patent boundaries, the patentee or the public?  
Patent holders often benefit from scope uncertainty because they can draft 
their different claims at successively narrower levels of precision and 
                                                                                                                 
 217. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine 
of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956–58 (2007) (discussing the "demise" of the 
doctrine of equivalents). 
 218. For an approach suggesting stronger ex post involvement of judges in mitigating 
patent problems, see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 7. 
 219. Menell et al., supra note 80, at 748. 
 220. See Long, supra note 202, at 477. 
1816 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737 (2011) 
coverage and can often selectively change the asserted scope ex post to 
dynamically reflect limitations, such as invalidating prior art. 
Patent law has issues concerning uncertainty that are unique compared 
to other, superficially similar areas.  Patent drafting is a hybrid between 
public law and contracting.  Like contract law, patent drafting allows one to 
be a "private lawmaker" by allowing private citizens to be in control of 
drafting legal obligations.221  Unlike contract law (and like public law) the 
scope of the privately drafted obligations are not limited to the contracting 
parties, but imposed on the entire public.222  Given that broad patent rights 
depend upon words chosen by applicant, and that patentees benefit from 
ambiguity, it is somewhat surprising that applicants are not required to bear 
this risk.  Most drafting attorneys deliberately employ as much ambiguity in 
patent drafting as will benefit their client and still survive the examination 
process.223  Uncertainty is often beneficial to patentees because it allows 
them leeway in ex post coverage to prevent underinclusion in infringement.  
Indeed, canons of construction dictate that judges interpret claims ex post to 
preserve validity.  Ex ante, patent applicants can assert claim scopes 
through the entire valid and invalid range of plausible interpretation.  Rules 
that permit uncertain claims to issue simply shift the risks of over and 
underinclusion away from the patent holder and onto third parties who bear 
the costs of such uncertain boundaries in internalizing infringement risk. 
Requiring more precise and rigid ex ante boundary delineation by 
patentees, and thereby increasing the risk of ex post underinclusion of a 
claim’s literal coverage, may actually reduce net transaction costs.  The 
patent applicant is usually the party in the best position to know the actual 
contours and inventive contribution of her invention.  Thus, to the extent a 
patent claim can be precisely defined ex ante to better match the inventive 
contribution and cover relevant products, the patentee is clearly the best 
party to do so. Given that patentees may not currently suffer the 
consequence of uncertainty, increasing ex ante disclosures may reduce the 
level of deliberate uncertainty and better align incentives to better reflect 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Of course, this "control" is somewhat limited, given that the patent drafter has to 
proceed through the patent examination process.  It may be more accurate to say that the 
patent is partially drafted by the applicant (or the applicant’s attorney) and partially by the 
patent examiner through rejections or allowances that shape its scope. 
 222. There is admittedly a limited scope of these privately drafted obligations.  
Unlike lawmakers, patentees cannot broadly legislate.  Rather, their privately drafted 
legislation is strictly confined to delineating the boundaries of their exclusive rights. 
 223. See generally FABER, supra note 119. 
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actual scope.  A similar effect may occur through interpretive "penalty 
default" rules that incentivize clarification.224 
C.  Foreseeable Interventions:  Strategic Uncertainty Reduction 
One might be concerned about burdens on patent applicants and 
examiners if adopting a broad requirement that definitions be supplied for 
every claim word.  This section suggests a series of more limited 
approaches that might be more feasible.  Because they are guided by the 
model, these targeted policy changes can still produce significant benefits 
in reducing scope uncertainty with comparatively small costs. 
1.  Internalization of External Disclosures 
"Disclosure internalization" is one approach aimed at improving scope 
certainty while reducing up-front application burden.  This method involves 
referencing particular extrinsic sources within the text of the patent 
document.  This can be thought of as "converting" extrinsic evidence into 
intrinsic evidence by bringing external sources of meaning partially within 
the four corners of the document.  In the previous section, I detailed the 
benefits of patentee-supplied definitions in terms of ex ante determinability 
of scope criteria in the public record.  Drafting specific definitions for each 
patent claim involves significant information costs above and beyond the 
drafting burdens already required.  Internalization occurs when patentees 
explicitly identify, in the specification, specific intrinsic sources of meaning 
to be used later in interpretation.  Internalization of an extrinsic source can 
be direct, through copying the text of a source into the specification, or 
indirect, through explicit reference to a particular external source. 
There are several variations on this approach.  The most cost-intensive 
change would be to require, for each patent word, a copy of a specific 
definition from a treatise within the four corners of the patent document.  A 
slightly less cost-intensive approach would be to permit a reference to a 
                                                                                                                 
 224. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 96 (1989) (describing penalty default 
rules which penalize ex ante non-clarification).  One version involves construing ambiguities 
against the drafter.  Id. at 104 n.80. 
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specific version of a dictionary or treatise, a definition within that edition, 
and a specific meaning within the chosen definition.  Finally, the least 
burdensome variation on this theme would be to specify one or more 
specific editions of dictionaries and treatises that would be used to resolve 
questions of meanings within the document.  Joseph Miller and James 
Hilsenteger have previously advocated for the increased use of dictionaries 
by reference in the patent document.225  Others have suggested that the 
Patent and Trademark Office create an official default technical dictionary 
with specific definitions for common claim words.226  A patent applicant 
could explicitly incorporate these standard definitions deliberately by 
reference. 
Internalizing extrinsic sources of information can help reduce scope 
uncertainty at minimal up-front cost.  The most tangible benefit of 
internalizing external sources of meaning is that it potentially reduces the ex 
ante determinability problems typical of extrinsic sources.  For example, if 
using an extrinsic dictionary ex post to define scope, a lay interpreter cannot 
predict ahead of time which dictionary or which definition will ultimately 
be used.  Internalization mitigates this problem if we require reference to a 
particular dictionary/treatise and one specific meaning for a claim word.  
During prosecution, a patent examiner can reference the external source 
both to know the intended scope, and to seek clarification if the elected 
scope is not precise enough.  Similarly, lay interpreters can reference 
specific meanings, thereby reducing, but not necessarily eliminating, one 
source of uncertainty.  Such external references must be readily available to 
the public for the technique to be useful.227  In this way, extrinsic sources 
become part of the ex ante determinable public record.  
Internalizing extrinsic disclosures also addresses another problem with 
extrinsic sources—lack of contextual integrity within the scope of the 
patent process.  The Phillips court considered extrinsic evidence less 
reliable because it "is not part of the patent and does not have the 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key:  Roles and 
Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 886–87 
(2005) (advocating for the patent office to require inventors to indicate a preferred dictionary 
in patent applications). 
 226. Joseph Miller has suggested this very promising idea. 
 227. Alternatively, the meanings could be copied (or paraphrased) directly into the text 
of the specification to avoid this problem.  There may be copyright issues with extensive 
copying. 
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specification’s virtue of being created at the time of patent prosecution."228  
Internalizing extrinsic sources partially mitigates this problem.  The patent 
applicant has the ability to examine the extrinsically defined meaning and 
explicitly adopt that meaning by reference in the specification.  Finally, 
internalization of extrinsic sources can help overcome the temporal problem 
of changing meaning.  By reference to specific meanings in specific 
editions of past dictionaries we are able to conceptually make meaning 
static to a greater degree by fixing past understandings of words in the 
interpretive context of the various constraints at the time. Although partial 
internalization is a compromise approach it could provide a meaningful, 
marginal improvement in certainty with the least amount of cost tradeoff. 
2.  Foreseeable Boundary Clarification 
A slightly different approach focuses upon clarifying foreseeable claim 
boundary issues in the public record.  There are several, common patterns 
of scope uncertainty that arise in patent litigation.  Many of these are 
predictable and can suggest a strategic use of limited patent examiner 
resources during examination to efficiently reduce uncertainty issues.229 
At a general level, rather than requiring definitions for every word, 
examiners could require explicit clarification only for particular claim 
words that are poorly scoped.230  Highly abstract or open-ended criteria are 
likely to be particularly problematic in this regard.  Examiners can quickly 
identify problematic terms by adopting a theoretical frame based upon the 
model’s principle of bivalence.  Given a claim word "X," is there sufficient 
interpretive information to distinguish a product with X from one without 
X?  If not, then the patent applicant should likely be required to provide 
some additional scope-refining disclosure on the record.  Examiners can ask 
two highly relevant scope-defining questions for the record:  "What is an 
example or definition of an X, and why?"  And importantly, "What is a 
                                                                                                                 
 228. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 229. This approach would involve adopting patent examiner incentives and 
requirements to aim at improving the scope certainty of issued claims. 
 230. In areas that involve inherently well-scoped terms, or terms with widely agreed 
upon meanings, such as molecular structures, examiners could use their discretion and assess 
that ex post extrinsic analysis would still provide sufficient scope benefits. 
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definition of something that is not an X, and why?"  It is this latter, 
excluding aspect of scope-limiting disclosures that bivalence highlights. 
There are also specific areas that are efficient targets for examiners’ 
focus.  Although claims are usually made up of multiple elements, not all 
elements are equally important.  Usually there is a subset of the elements 
that capture the invention’s unique contribution over the prior art.  The 
remainder of the elements often consists of structures or combinations well 
known in the prior art and potentially less likely to be of future controversy.  
With limited resources, examiners can focus scope-defining resources on 
those novel elements likely to be the source of controversy. 
Other predictable scope issues concern embodiments.  Defendants 
often argue that features that are common to all embodiments in the 
specification should be read as implicit scope limitations.  An examiner 
could easily spot such a limitation by scanning the embodiments and 
require an applicant to explicitly clarify this scope ambiguity, whether the 
implicit limitation is intended or not, on the prosecution record.  Similar 
scope issues surround common points of debate: whether the scope is 
limited to materials that the parts of the embodiments are made out of, the 
location and positioning of key parts of the embodiments and whether they 
matter, whether the invention is limited to the inventive context displayed 
by the embodiments, timing, which claim elements are meant to refer to 
what parts of the invention, and so on.231  As previously argued, there is 
justification in requiring explicit ex ante clarification from the applicant. 
Finally, the adequacy of the scope of a term is relative to the set of 
potentially accused products.  Examiners could compare abstract claim text 
against relevant competitive products to determine if scope criteria are 
adequate.  These are some examples in which problems of scope 
underdetermination may be efficiently reduced ex ante.  Not all uncertainty 
issues are foreseeable or tractable, but some may be efficiently reduced 
with only relatively minimal clarification costs.  In this way, patent 
examiners will surely not remove all scope uncertainty ex ante, but they can 
efficiently head off particularly foreseeable uncertainty issues and reduce 
external costs to competitors. 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Scope defining questions can forestall certain but not all scope issues.  Most scope 
issues can be reduced to "all" or "some" questions.  For example, does the term "motor 
vehicles" apply to all motors or just internal combustion motors? 
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VI.  Conclusion 
It is often difficult to discern, with any degree of certainty, the 
coverage of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office.  Given the 
broad liability possible under patent law, such scope uncertainty can result 
in significant external costs to firms and users.  This Article develops a 
model of one common source of scope uncertainty—scope 
underdetermination.  Scope underdetermination exists when the words of a 
patent claim are capable of a broad range of plausible interpretations in 
light of the patent document, under the interpretive rules.  
Underdetermination creates ex ante uncertainty about patent scope because 
a lay interpreter cannot know with certainty which interpretation will 
ultimately be used in an infringement proceeding.  The choice of one 
interpretive scope over another could be dispositive on the issue of literal 
infringement. 
This Article models the underdetermination issue by the set of possible 
interpretations plausible after restricting the scope based upon interpretive 
constraints internal and external to the patent document.  These constraints 
limit the range (and set) of possible meanings to varying degrees of 
certainty.  The set-theoretical model suggests an approach to marginally 
increasing the precision of a claim by adding targeted, clarifying constraints 
aimed at distinguishing potentially accused products or processes as 
literally infringing or not.  These additional pieces of scope-clarifying 
information can increase scope certainty to a lay interpreter. 
The Article concludes with policy modifications suggested by the 
model.  Generally, scope can be improved by requiring more precise scope 
delineation ex ante from patent applicants.  One approach is to require 
explicit definitions for claim words in the specification.  This has the 
benefit of reducing uncertainty by placing claim boundary lines in the 
determinable public record.  Patent examiners can require that these 
definitions be precise enough to make literal infringement determinations.  
A more limited approach enables patent examiners to focus upon requiring 
patent applicants to clarify foreseeably problematic claim boundary lines.  
These include disambiguating implicit scope limitations that might be 
inferred from included embodiments and similar predictable scenarios. 

